[top]Disease Information
16 December 2005
Vol. 18 - No. 50Contents
Q FEVER IN ARGENTINA
See also: 5 January 2006
(Date of previous outbreak of Q fever in Argentina reported to the OIE: 1998).
Immediate notification report
Translation of information received on 9 December 2005 from Dr Jorge Nestor Amaya, President, National Agrifood Health and Quality Service (SENASA(1)), Secretariat for Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Food, Buenos Aires:
Report date: 9 December 2005.
Reason for immediate notification: re-occurrence of a listed infection in a country.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 10 November 2005.
Clinical disease: no.
Nature of diagnosis: laboratory.
Details of outbreak:
First administrative division (province) Lower administrative division Type of epidemiological unit Name of the location Date of start of the outbreak Species Number of animals in the outbreak susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaughtered Buenos Aires General Rodriguez farm General Rodriguez 10 Nov. 2005 cap 297 24 … … 0 The cases were detected within the framework of an active surveillance programme for infectious diseases in caprines, carried out in dairy farms and breeding farms.
In the farm concerned, a total of 178 animals were tested, out of which 24 gave positive serological results. Positive animals were males and females over six months of age.
Diagnosis:
Laboratory where diagnostic tests were performed Species examined Diagnostic tests used Date Results DILACOT(1) (Martinez, province of Buenos Aires) cap complement fixation test 10 Nov. 2005 positive Note: There has not been any case of abortion suitable for sampling for pathogen isolation purposes.
Origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive.
Control measures
A. Undertaken:
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country.
B. To be undertaken:
- Slaughter of reactors and destruction of their carcasses will be carried out within the next few days.
- During slaughter, serum samples will be taken from all susceptible animals in the affected farm in order to determine the prevalence of infection.
- The necessary epidemiological investigations will be carried out in order to trace, inspect and sample the contact animals.
Treatment of affected animals: no.
Final report: no.
(1) SENASA: Servicio Nacional de Sanidad y Calidad Agroalimentaria
(2) DILACOT: Dirección de Laboratorios y Control Técnico (Directorate of the SENASA for laboratories and technical controls)
*
* *HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN UKRAINE
Follow-up report No. 1See also: 28 September 2006, 13 July 2006, 29 June 2006, 22 June 2006, 16 March 2006, 23 February 2006, 9 February 2006, 2 February 2006, 26 January 2006, 19 January 2006, 12 January 2006, 5 January 2006, 30 December 2005, 30 December 2005, 9 December 2005
Information received on 10 December 2005 from Dr Petr I. Verbytskiy, Head, State Department for Veterinary Medicine, Ministry of Agricultural Policy, Kiev:
End of previous report period: 5 December 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [49], 485, dated 9 December 2005).
End of this report period: 10 December 2005.
Identification of agent: influenza virus subtype H5.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 2 December 2005.
Date of start of the event: 25 November 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.
Details of outbreaks (updated data):
First admini-strative division Lower administrative division (district) Type of epidemiological unit Name of the location Latitude Longitude Date of start of the outbreak Species Number of animals in the outbreaks susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaughtered Crimea* Dzhankoyskiy village Pushkino 45º 50’ N 34º 24’ E 25 Nov. 2005 avi 1,800 63 63 1,737 0 Crimea* Dzhankoyskiy village Zavet-Leninskoe 45º 51’ N 34º 24’ E 25 Nov. 2005 avi 4,222 389 389 3,833 0 Crimea* Nizhnegorskiy village Izobilnoe 45º 35’ N 34º 58’ E 25 Nov. 2005 avi 3,800 345 345 3,455 0 Crimea* Nizhnegorskiy village Yemelyanovka 45º 31’ N 34º 55’ E 25 Nov. 2005 avi 4,000 265 265 3,735 0 Crimea* Sovetskiy village Nekrasovka 45º 27’ N 35º 00’ E 25 Nov. 2005 avi 6,076 879 879 5,197 0 * Autonomous Republic of Crimea
Note by the OIE Animal Health Information Department: A total of 18,744 birds were destroyed around the outbreaks.
On 6 December 2005, samples were sent to the laboratory of Vladimir, in Russia (Russia national reference laboratory for avian influenza).
On 8 December 2005, material was sent to the laboratory of Weybridge, United Kingdom (OIE Reference Laboratory for avian influenza).
Details of new outbreaks:
First admini-strative division Lower administrative division (district) Type of epidemiological unit Name of the location Latitude Longitude Date of start of the outbreak Species Number of animals in the outbreaks susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaughtered Crimea* Feodosiya village Primorske 45º 32’ N 35º 30’ E 9 Dec. 2005 avi … 1 1 0 0 Crimea* Feodosiya village Sonyachne 45º 03’ N 35º 21’ E 9 Dec. 2005 avi … 2 2 0 0 Crimea* Krasnoperekopskiy village Voyinka 9 Dec. 2005 avi … 7 7 0 0 Crimea* Nizhnegorskiy village Akimivka 45º 30’ N 34º 51’ E 7 Dec. 2005 avi 5,513 14 14 0 0 Crimea* Nizhnegorskiy village Khlebnoye 45º 24’ N 34º 52’ E 7 Dec. 2005 avi … 1 1 0 0 Crimea* Nizhnegorskiy village Kirsanovka 45º 29’ N 34º 51’ E 7 Dec. 2005 avi … 4 4 0 0 Crimea* Nizhnegorskiy village Zorkino 45º 33’ N 34º 42’ E 7 Dec. 2005 avi 7,894 6 6 0 0 Crimea* Simferopol farm 45º 03’ N 34º 06’ E 9 Dec. 2005 avi .. 1 1 0 0 Crimea* Sovetskiy village Chornozemne 45º 24’ N 34º 48’ E 7 Dec. 2005 avi 3,923 22 22 0 0 Crimea* Sovetskiy village Dmytrivka 45º 29’ N 35º 04’ E 7 Dec. 2005 avi 17,210 13 13 0 0 Crimea* Sovetskiy village Krasnoflotske 45º 22’ N 34º 57’ E 7 Dec. 2005 avi 5,130 4 4 0 0 Crimea* Sovetskiy village Sovetske 45º 20’ N 34º 55’ E 7 Dec. 2005 avi … 3 3 0 0 * Autonomous Republic of Crimea
In these locations, clinical disease was reported in poultry. Laboratory tests are being conducted simultaneously at the Republic Laboratory of Veterinary Medicine of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Simferopol, and at the Central State Laboratory of Veterinary Medicine, Kiev.
Source of outbreaks or origin of infection: contact with wild birds.
Control measures undertaken:
- control of wildlife reservoirs;
- stamping out in progress;
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- screening;
- zoning;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishments.
Vaccination prohibited: yes.
Other details/comments:
As of 9 December 2005, in accordance with the Emergency Plan for eradication and prevention of spreading of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Ukraine, the State Department of Veterinary Medicine has taken appropriate measures, including the following:
- In locations where the disease has been registered, quarantine has been implemented and a protection zone (3 km) and surveillance zone (10 km) have been designated.
- In the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (AR Crimea), six quarantine militia posts have been organised.
- Movement from AR Crimean quarantine zones into other establishments and sale to the population of live poultry, commodity and incubatory eggs, poultry products, feedingstuffs, equipment and poultry manure have been prohibited.
- Throughout the territory of Ukraine, the sale of live poultry and poultry products produced in private village households in AR Crimea has been temporarily prohibited.
- Throughout the territory of AR Crimea, the National Veterinary Service has formed 205 groups to perform clinical examination of poultry in the private sector. As of 9 December 2005, 11,902 households have been inspected in 167 locations, in which 1,087,055 birds are being kept. In the event of deaths in poultry, samples are collected and sent to the Crimean Republic Laboratory of Veterinary Medicine for the appropriate tests to be performed.
- Shooting of game birds is prohibited throughout the territory of Ukraine until 1 February 2006.
- Shooting of wild birds for laboratory diagnostic testing has been organised.
Final report: no.
*
* *AMERICAN FOULBROOD IN CHILE
Follow-up report No. 6See also: 30 March 2006, 2 March 2006, 26 January 2006, 12 January 2006, 23 December 2005, 9 December 2005, 2 December 2005, 25 November 2005, 18 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 28 October 2005
Translation of information received on 13 December 2005 from Dr Hernan Rojas Olavarria, Head, Division of Animal Protection, Livestock and Agriculture Service (SAG), Ministry of Agriculture, Santiago:
End of previous report period: 6 December 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [49], 489, dated 9 December 2005).
End of this report period: 13 December 2005.
Precise identification of agent: Paenibacillus larvae subsp. larvae.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 20 October 2005.
Date of start of the event: 15 October 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical and laboratory.
Details of new outbreaks:
First administrative division Lower administrative divisions Type of epide-miologi-cal unit Name of the location (sector) Latitude Longitude Date of start of the outbreak Species Number of animals* in the outbreaks susceptible cases destroyed III Region Alto del Carmen apiary El Olivo-Chigüinto 28º 49' 13.5220" S 70º 20' 47.0249" W 30 Oct. 2005 api 9 1 1 V Region Putaendo apiary Quebrada Herrera 32º 41' 57.8010" S 70º 44' 46.8038" W 17 Nov. 2005 api 30 4 4 V Region Putaendo apiary Piguchén 27º 41' 37.6691" S 70º 36' 26.8688" W 18 Nov. 2005 api 74 15 15 V Region Putaendo apiary Putaendo 32º 38' 47.0209" S 70º 43' 5.5407" W 17 Nov. 2005 api 15 13 13 V Region Putaendo apiary Granallas 32º 38' 35.1024" S 70º 43' 50.6332" W 18 Nov. 2005 api 112 47 47 * hives
Source of new outbreaks: contact with affected hives.
Control measures undertaken:
- quarantine;
- partial stamping out;
- movement control inside the country;
- zoning.
Final report: no.
*
* *CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER IN SOUTH AFRICA
Follow-up report No. 4See also: 16 September 2005, 19 August 2005, 29 July 2005, 15 July 2005
Information received on 14 December 2005 from Dr Botlhe M. Modisane, Senior Manager of Animal Health, National Department of Agriculture, Pretoria:
End of previous report period: 12 September 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [37], 306, dated 16 September 2005).
End of this report period: 13 December 2005.
Identification of agent: the classical swine fever (CSF) virus isolated is closely related to a Chinese 2.1 isolate found in 1998.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 8 July 2005.
Date of start of the event: 13 June 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.
The only new outbreaks to have been identified by the ongoing survey taking place throughout the country were in Eastern Cape Province.
New outbreaks:
First administrative division (province) Lower administrative division Type of epidemiological unit Name of the location Latitude Longitude Date of start of the outbreak Species Number of animals in the outbreaks susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaughtered Eastern Cape Blue Crane Route farm Morning Star 32º 48" S 25º 48" E Oct. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Buffalo City village East London 32º 59" S 27º 52" E Oct. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Buffalo City village Kingwilliamstown 32º 52" S 27º 24" E Oct. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Emalahleni village Lady Frere 31º 42" S 27º 13" E Nov. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Engcobo village Mbashe River 31º 43" S 28º 19" E Aug. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Gariep village Burgersdorp 31º 00" S 26º 19" E Oct. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Ingquza village Flagstaff 31º 04" S 29º 29" E Sept. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Ingquza village Lisikisiki 31º 22" S 29º 33" E Nov. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Inkwanca village Sterkstroom 31º 33" S 26º 34" E Oct. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Inxuba Yethemba farm Riverside 32º 27" S 25º 45" E Aug. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape King Sabata Dalindyebo village Qumbu 31º 59" S 28º 42" E Aug. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Lukanji farm Maidenhead 31º 48" S 26º 49" E Aug. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Lukanji village Mlungisi 31º 54" S 26º 51" E Aug. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Lukanji farm Peninsula 32º 05" S 27º 10" E Aug. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Lukanji village Queenstown 31º 50" S 26º 53" E Aug. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Lukanji village Whittleseas 31º 52" S 26º 54" E Oct. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Malethswai village Aliwal North 30º 41" S 26º 42" E Oct. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Malethswai farm Endwell 31º 18" S 26º 59" E Aug. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Mbhashe village Idutywa 32º 05" S 28º 18" E Aug. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Mbhashe village Mazeppa 32º 26" S 28º 40" E Aug. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Mbhashe village Ngadla 32º 24" S 28º 40" E Aug. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Mbhashe village Ngcizele 32º 22" S 28º 36" E Aug. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Mbhashe village Ngxutyana 32º 22" S 28º 36" E Aug. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Mbhashe village Willowvale 32º 04" S 28º 30" E Oct. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Mbizana village Bizana 30º 51" S 29º 51" E Nov. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Mnquma village East London Rural 32º 58" S 27º 58" E Oct. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Nelson Mandela village Uitenhage 33º 46" S 25º 22" E Oct. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Ngqushwa village Emabheleni 33º 22" S 27º 04" E Aug. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Nkonkobe village Phumlani 32º 48" S 26º 47" E Aug. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Nyandeni village Libode 31º 32" S 29º 00" E Nov. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Nyandeni village Ngqeleni 31º 40" S 29º 01" E Aug. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Port St Johns village Macibe 31º 32" S 29º 20" E Aug. 2005 sui … … … … … Eastern Cape Umzimvubu village Mount Frere 30º 54" S 28º 58" E Oct. 2005 sui … … … … … Description of affected populations: pigs reared in communal areas are mainly involved.
Source of outbreaks: unknown or inconclusive.
Control measures:
- In Eastern Cape province:
Intensive surveillance measures are still in place in order to detect any possible extension of the epizootic.
The stamping-out campaign is continuing. All affected pigs are culled and their cadavers buried. The estimated number of pigs exposed is 150,000, of which 131,000 have already been culled.
Pigs and pig products are not allowed out of the infected areas and a complete ban of the movement of pigs and pig products out of the Eastern Cape Province has been instituted.
- In the whole of South Africa:
Temporary State veterinary movement control measures have been instituted for all transport of live pigs and pig carcasses across all provincial boundaries throughout the whole of South Africa.
Due to the highly infectious nature of CSF, South Africa has voluntarily decided to impose an export ban on all pigs and pig products in the interests of protecting its trading partners against this disease. This ban includes all live pigs, genetic material and pork products, including heat-treated meat. Processed products such as fully mounted trophies, salted hides, tusks dipped in formalin, that have been suitably treated and disinfected are excluded from this ban.
Vaccination prohibited: yes.
Other details/comments:
In Western Cape Province, the last cases of CSF were seen during July 2005. Stamping out and disinfection of the infected premises were completed by the end of July 2005.
Final report: no.
*
* *HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN CROATIA
Follow-up report No. 3See also: 9 February 2006, 19 January 2006, 28 October 2005, 28 October 2005, 28 October 2005
Information received on 14 December 2005 from Dr Mate Brstilo, Director of the Veterinary Administration, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Zagreb:
End of previous report period: 27 October 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [43], 381, dated 28 October 2005).
End of this report period: 13 December 2005.
Identification of agent: highly pathogenic avian influenza virus serotype H5N1.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 21 October 2005.
Date of start of the event: 19 October 2005.
Clinical disease: yes.
Nature of diagnosis: laboratory.
During regular monitoring activities conducted at ‘Grudnjak’(1) fish pond, one swan in a flock of around 280 swans showed clinical signs of avian influenza. The sick swan and two apparently healthy swans from the flock were shot for diagnostic purposes; samples were taken and sent to the Poultry Centre of the Croatian Veterinary Institute in Zagreb. Laboratory testing revealed that the samples taken from the swan that had shown clinical signs were positive for avian influenza virus subtype H5N1 (PQGERRRKKRGLF). The samples taken from the other two swans were found to be negative for avian influenza. The corpses of all three swans were destroyed.
In the same location, 13 other birds (coots, grebes and wild ducks) were shot for diagnostic purposes. Samples from these 13 birds were tested at the Poultry Centre of the Croatian Veterinary Institute in Zagreb and were all found to be negative for avian influenza.
Details of outbreak:
First administrative division (County) Lower administrative division (municipality) Type of epidemiological unit Name of the location Latitude Longitude Start of the outbreak Species Number of animals in the outbreak susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaughtered Viroviticko-Podravska Zdenci village Grudnjak 45º38'047" N 18º 03' 482" E 19 Nov. 2005 fau 300 1 0 … 0 Diagnosis:
Laboratory where diagnostic tests were performed Birds examined Diagnostic tests used Date Results Poultry Centre of the Croatian Veterinary Institute, Zagreb swans virus isolation in chicken embryos 6 Dec. 2005 positive haemagglutination inhibition test 6 Dec. 2005 positive RT-PCR(2) 6 Dec. 2005 positive Source of outbreak or origin of infection: seasonal migration of wild birds - swans.
Control measures undertaken:
- control of wildlife reservoirs;
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- screening;
- zoning;
- disinfection of infected areas.
Treatment of affected animals: no.
Vaccination prohibited: yes.
Final report: no.
(1) See also the Immediate notification report
(2) RT-PCR: reverse transcriptase - polymerase chain reaction
*
* *HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN ROMANIA
Follow-up report No. 12See also: 2 March 2006, 23 February 2006, 16 February 2006, 19 January 2006, 5 January 2006, 30 December 2005, 23 December 2005, 9 December 2005, 2 December 2005, 2 December 2005, 25 November 2005, 18 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 28 October 2005, 21 October 2005, 21 October 2005, 14 October 2005, 14 October 2005
Information received on 12 and 15 December 2005 from Dr Gabriel Predoi, Director General, National Sanitary Veterinary and Food Safety Authority, Bucharest:
End of previous report period: 8 December 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [49], 497, dated 9 December 2005).
End of this report period: 15 December 2005.
Identification of agent: highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus serotype H5.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 7 October 2005.
Date of start of the event: 4 October 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical and laboratory.
Confirmation of outbreak:
The suspected outbreak in the village of Crisan (Crisan district, Tulcea county), which was reported in Follow-up Report No. 11, was confirmed by the laboratory(1).
New outbreaks:
First administrative division (County) Lower administrative division (district) Name of the location (village) Date of start of the outbreak Species Number of animals in the outbreaks susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaughtered Braila Dudesti Tataru … avi 295 73 67 228 0 Buzau Braiesti Goidesti … avi 23 21 21 2 0 Buzau Padina Padina … avi 44 11 19 25 0 Calarasi Modelu Tonea … avi 81 81 81 0 0 Description of affected population in the new outbreaks: backyard flocks.
Diagnosis:
Laboratory where diagnostic tests were performed Outbreak Samples examined Diagnostic tests used Date Results Institute for Diagnostics and Animal Health (national reference laboratory) Tataru village Samples were taken from 2 hens, as follows:
- 10 cloacal swabs and organs (brain, lungs, trachea, bowels, heart, liver, kidneys).
a. RT-PCR(3) for detection of specific viral genome;
b. rapid test for HPAI diagnosis;
c. virus isolation in SPF(2) embryonated eggs.
13 Dec. 2005 a. positive;
b. positive;
c. positive.
Goidesti village Samples were taken from 1 hen and 1 turkey hen, as follows:
- 10 cloacal swabs and 6 tracheal swabs from 1 hen and 1 turkey hen;
- organs (brain, lungs, trachea, bowels, heart, liver, kidneys) from 1 hen.
a. rapid test for the detection of HPAI viral antigen;
b. RT-PCR(3) for detection of specific viral genome;
c. virus isolation in SPF(2) embryonated eggs.
12 Dec. 2005 a. positive;
b. positive;
c. positive for all samples.
Padina village Samples were taken from poultry (12 ducks+7 hens), as follows:
- 105 cloacal swabs and 42 tracheal swabs from 12 ducks and 7 hens;
- organs (brain, lungs, trachea, bowels, heart, liver, kidneys) from 3 hens;
- 6 blood samples from ducks.
virus isolation in SPF(2) embryonated eggs 12 Dec. 2005 positive for all samples examined Tonea village Samples were taken from 5 hens, as follows:
- 25 cloacal and tracheal swabs;
- organs (brain, lungs, trachea, bowels, heart, liver, kidneys).
a. rapid test for the detection of HPAI viral antigen;
b. RT-PCR(3) for detection of specific viral genome;
c. virus isolation in SPF(2) embryonated eggs.
13 Dec. 2005 a. positive;
b. positive;
c. positive.
Origin of infection: contact with wild birds.
Control measures
A. Undertaken:
- stamping out (outbreaks in Padina and Goidesti);
- partial stamping out (outbreaks in Tataru and Tonea);
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- screening;
- zoning;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishments.
B. To be undertaken:
- control of wildlife reservoirs.
Vaccination prohibited: no.
Other details/comments:
Outbreak (village) Control measures Epidemiology Tataru Control measures have been applied in Tataru in the past few days: partial stamping out has been applied to the infected premises and to neighbouring backyard premises, in accordance with the legislative provisions in force (Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development Order No. 311, Art. 10). A total of 2,485 poultry were culled and destroyed. Corpses were destroyed by burning and burying. Backyard premises in the locality have been disinfected.
Movement control has been applied to people, poultry, poultry products, feed, etc.
There is a lake in immediate vicinity of the village which justifies the presence of migratory birds in the affected area. Goidesti The application of control measures began on 11 December 2005. The outbreak appeared in a hamlet with only five households. Padina The application of control measures began on 12 December 2005. The entire flock of Padina consists of almost 47,000 poultry. Stamping out will be applied to all birds within the affected locality. Culling of poultry will be performed by gassing with CO2 in containers. Corpses will be destroyed by burning and burying. Backyard premises and roads in the locality will be disinfected.
Movement control will be applied to all transport of people, poultry, poultry products, feed, etc.
In the affected area there are no lakes or pools that could account for the presence of migratory birds. The infection probably took place when a flock of migrating birds stopped to rest. Tonea The application of control measures began on 14 December 2005. Partial stamping out is being applied in the infected backyard premises and in the immediate vicinity. A total of 375 poultry have been culled, and 29 premises have been disinfected.
Movement control has been applied to the entire village.
The outbreak appeared in a small village in the vicinity of Danube meadow land and some small lakes, alongside the corridors used by migrating birds. The main concern in this case is the presence of some large poultry farms around Modelu district. Final report: no.
(1) Note by the OIE Animal Health Information Department: this information, which was received at the OIE Headquarters on 6 December 2005, was inadvertently omitted from Disease Information, 18 (49), 497-499.
(2) SPF: specific pathogen-free
(3) RT-PCR: reverse transcriptase - polymerase chain reaction
*
* *HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN CHINA (PEOPLE'S REP. OF ~)
Follow-up report No. 11See also: 5 October 2006, 17 August 2006, 27 July 2006, 6 July 2006, 22 June 2006, 8 June 2006, 9 February 2006, 12 January 2006, 5 January 2006, 2 December 2005, 25 November 2005, 18 November 2005, 11 November 2005, 11 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 28 October 2005, 21 October 2005, 12 August 2005
Information received on 15 December 2005 from Mr Jia Youling, Director General, Veterinary Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture, Beijing:
End of previous report period: 30 November 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [48], 461, dated 2 December 2005).
End of this report period: 15 December 2005.
Identification of agent: highly pathogenic avian influenza virus serotype H5N1.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 7 June 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.
Details of new outbreak:
First administrative division Lower administrative division Type of epidemiological unit Name of the location Date of start of the outbreak Species Number of animals in the outbreak susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaughtered Jiangxi province Suichuan county village Shangxi … avi … 3,100 1,640 150,065 0 Description of affected population in the new outbreak: ducks.
Diagnosis:
Laboratory where diagnostic tests were performed Diagnostic tests used Date Results Harbin Veterinary Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Harbin (national reference laboratory for avian influenza) - haemagglutination inhibition test;
- RT-PCR(1).
15 Dec. 2005 positive intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) test 15 Dec. 2005 positive (highly pathogenic) Source of new outbreaks: unknown or inconclusive.
Control measures undertaken:
- stamping out;
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- screening;
- zoning;
- vaccination;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishments;
- dipping/spraying.
Final report: no.
(1) RT-PCR: reverse transcriptase - polymerase chain reaction
*
* *NEWCASTLE DISEASE IN ROMANIA
Follow-up report No. 3See also: 21 December 2006, 2 November 2006, 15 June 2006, 6 April 2006, 9 March 2006, 23 February 2006, 2 February 2006, 19 January 2006, 5 January 2006, 30 December 2005, 9 December 2005, 2 December 2005, 25 November 2005
Information received on 15 December 2005 from Dr Gabriel Predoi, Director General, National Sanitary Veterinary and Food Safety Authority, Bucharest:
End of previous report period: 9 December 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [49], 499, dated 9 December 2005).
End of this report period: 15 December 2005.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 14 October 2005.
Date of start of the event: 15 September 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.
New outbreaks:
First administrative division (County) Lower administrative division Name of the location Date of start of the outbreak Species Number of animals in the outbreaks susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaughtered Calarasi Oltenita Oltenita 21 Nov. 2005 avi* 30 17 17 13 0 Ilfov Dascalu Dascalu … avi* 145 145 145 0 0 * backyard hens
Diagnosis:
Laboratory where diagnostic tests were performed Outbreak Samples examined Diagnostic test used Date Results Institute for Diagnostics and Animal Health (national reference laboratory) Dascalu organ samples taken from 1 hen corpse - ICPI(1) test on day-old SPF(2) chicks;
- virus isolation in embryonated SPF eggs.
12 Dec. 2005 ICPI=1.68
positive
organ samples taken from 1 hen corpse - ICPI(1) test on day-old SPF(2) chicks;
- virus isolation in embryonated SPF eggs.
12 Dec. 2005 ICPI=1.62
positive
organ samples taken from 2 hen corpses - ICPI(1) test on day-old SPF(2) chicks;
- virus isolation in embryonated SPF eggs.
12 Dec. 2005 ICPI=1.67
positive
Oltenita 3 cloacal swabs, 3 tracheal swabs and 3 organ samples taken from 3 hen corpses - ICPI(1) test on day-old SPF(2) chicks;
- virus isolation in embryonated SPF eggs.
13 Dec. 2005 ICPI=1.7
positive
Source of new outbreaks: unknown or inconclusive.
Control measures
A. Undertaken:
- stamping out;
- quarantine;
- disinfection of infected premises;
- screening;
- zoning;
- movement control inside the country.
B. To be undertaken:
- control of wildlife reservoirs.
Vaccination prohibited: no.
Other details/comments: the disease appeared in vaccinated flocks (the vaccine was probably not of the appropriate quality).
Final report: no.
(1) ICPI: intracerebral pathogenity index
(2) SPF: specific pathogen free
*
* *HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN THAILAND
Follow-up report No. 80See also: 16 November 2006, 3 August 2006, 27 July 2006, 6 April 2006, 16 February 2006, 2 February 2006, 26 January 2006, 19 January 2006, 12 January 2006, 23 December 2005, 9 December 2005, 2 December 2005, 25 November 2005, 18 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 28 October 2005, 21 October 2005, 14 October 2005, 7 October 2005, 30 September 2005, 23 September 2005, 16 September 2005, 9 September 2005, 2 September 2005, 26 August 2005, 19 August 2005, 12 August 2005, 29 July 2005, 22 July 2005, 15 July 2005
Information received on 16 December 2005 from Dr Yukol Limlamthong, Director General, Department of Livestock Development (DLD), Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Bangkok:
End of previous report period: 8 December 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [49], 497, dated 9 December 2005).
End of this report period: 15 December 2005.
No new outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza were reported during the week under report.
Final report: no.
*
* *MISCELLANEOUS: AVIAN INFLUENZA IN CANADA (FOLLOW-UP REPORT NO. 3)
See also: 4 May 2006, 9 December 2005, 2 December 2005, 25 November 2005
Information received on 15 December 2005 from Dr Brian Evans, Executive Director, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Ottawa:
End of previous report period: 8 December 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [49], 203, dated 9 December 2005).
End of this report period: 15 December 2005.
Identification of agent: influenza virus type A, serotype H5N2, low pathogenic North American strain.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 18 November 2005.
Date of start of the event: 17 November 2005.
With the conclusion of repetitive negative testing of premises within the 5-km surveillance zone over the course of the recognised 21-day incubation period, the quarantines on the test-negative farms were lifted with effect from 10 December 2005. Quarantines have been lifted on all commercial premises, other than the index premises and the associated second location under common ownership and management, with effect from 10 December 2005.
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency has now removed the 5-km surveillance zone and movement restrictions other than those applied to the compartment* now defined as the index farm and the second associated premises. In accordance with Article 2.7.12.3 (2) of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code, this new compartment* will continue to be considered as infected for a 3-month period following the completion of the cleaning and disinfection of the two premises and associated surveillance.
Final report: no.
* The term 'compartment' means one or more establishments under a common biosecurity management system containing an animal subpopulation with a distinct health status with respect to a specific disease or specific diseases for which required surveillance, control and biosecurity measures have been applied for the purpose of international trade. (Article 1.1.1.1., Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 2005 Edition).
*
* *
http://www.oie.int/
Copyright
© 2004 OIE
World Animal Health Organisation