[top]Disease Information
29 July 2005
Vol. 18 - No. 30Contents
BLUETONGUE IN SPAIN
Virus detection in cattleSee also: 19 January 2006, 14 October 2005
(Date of previous outbreak of bluetongue in Spain reported to the OIE: December 2004 [clinical outbreak]).
Immediate notification report
Translation of information received on 22 and 27 July 2005 from Dr Arnaldo Cabello Navarro, Deputy Director General of Animal Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Madrid:
Report date: 22 July 2005.
Reason for immediate notification: re-occurrence of a listed infection in the country.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 21 July 2005.
Date of start of the event: 18 July 2005.
Clinical disease: no.
Nature of diagnosis: laboratory.
Details of outbreak:
First administrative division (Autonomous Community) Lower administrative division (province) Type of epide-miolo-gical unit Name of the location Spe-cies Number of animals in the outbreak susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered Andalusia Huelva ... Encinasola bov 121 47* 0 0 0 * without clinical signs
Diagnosis:
Laboratory where diagnosis was made Species examined Diagnostic tests used Date Results Central Veterinary Laboratory, Algete bov RT-PCR(1) 21 July 2005 positive Origin of infection: unknown.
Control measures: control of arthropods and other measures in accordance with Directive 2000/75/EC of the Council of the European Union, dated 20 November 2000, laying down specific provisions for the control and eradication of bluetongue.
Treatment of affected animals: no.
Vaccination prohibited: no; vaccination requires an authorisation issued by the official Veterinary Services.
Other details/comments: the outbreak was reported within the restriction zone set up following the epizootics of 2004. Sheep in this zone were vaccinated in winter 2004-2005 (i.e. in the absence of vectors) using a live virus vaccine.
(1) RT-PCR: reverse transcriptase - polymerase chain reaction
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* *NEWCASTLE DISEASE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM/GREAT BRITAIN
Follow-up report No. 1See also: 30 November 2006, 23 November 2006, 16 November 2006, 9 November 2006, 2 November 2006, 26 October 2006, 19 October 2006, 26 January 2006, 26 August 2005, 19 August 2005, 12 August 2005, 22 July 2005
Information received on 29 July 2005 from Dr Debby Reynolds, Director General for Animal Health and Welfare, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), London:
End of previous report period: 15 July 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [29], 203, dated 22 July 2005).
End of this report period: 29 July 2005.
Details of outbreak (updated data):
First administrative division Lower administrative division Type of epide-miolo-gical unit Name of the location Spe-cies Number of animals in the outbreak susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered Surrey West Horsley farm West Horsley avi approx. 11,000 ... ... 10,240 0 *
* *VESICULAR STOMATITIS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Follow-up report No. 11See also: 28 December 2006, 7 December 2006, 23 November 2006, 16 November 2006, 2 November 2006, 26 October 2006, 19 October 2006, 12 October 2006, 5 October 2006, 28 September 2006, 21 September 2006, 14 September 2006, 7 September 2006, 31 August 2006, 24 August 2006, 13 April 2006, 16 February 2006, 26 January 2006, 12 January 2006, 23 December 2005, 9 December 2005, 18 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 28 October 2005, 21 October 2005, 14 October 2005, 7 October 2005, 30 September 2005, 23 September 2005, 16 September 2005, 2 September 2005, 26 August 2005, 19 August 2005, 5 August 2005, 15 July 2005, 8 July 2005
Information received on 21 and 27 July 2005 from Dr Peter Fernandez, Associate Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Washington, DC:
End of previous report period: 10 July 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [28], 200, dated 15 July 2005).
End of this report period: 24 July 2005.
Precise identification of agent: vesicular stomatitis virus type New Jersey.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 27 April 2005.
Date of start of the event: 16 April 2005.
New outbreaks:
First administrative division (State) Lower administrative division (County) Type of epide-miolo-gical unit Name of the location Date of start of the outbreak Spe-cies Number of animals in the outbreaks susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered Arizona Yavapai f Dewey 3 May 2005 equ 7 1 0 0 0 Arizona Yavapai f Wickenburg 12 May 2005 equ 18 1 0 0 0 bov 14 0 0 0 0 Colorado Delta f Austin 5 July 2005 equ 1 1 0 0 0 Colorado Delta f Cory 14 July 2005 equ 2 1 0 0 0 Colorado Delta f Delta 28 June 2005 equ 1 1 0 0 0 Colorado Delta f Delta 5 July 2005 equ 1 1 0 0 0 Colorado Delta f Delta 5 July 2005 equ 41 1 0 0 0 Colorado Delta f Delta 7 July 2005 equ 1 1 0 0 0 Colorado Delta f Olathe 28 June 2005 equ 1 1 0 0 0 Colorado La Plata f Hesperus 7 July 2005 equ 3 1 0 0 0 Colorado Mesa f Junction 12 July 2005 equ 3 1 0 0 0 Colorado Montrose f Montrose 30 June 2005 equ 6 1 0 0 0 Colorado Montrose f Montrose 1 July 2005 equ 1 1 0 0 0 Colorado Montrose f Montrose 5 July 2005 equ 1 1 0 0 0 Colorado Montrose f Montrose 10 July 2005 equ 4 1 0 0 0 Colorado Montrose f Montrose 11 July 2005 bov 30 1 0 0 0 Colorado Montrose f Montrose 11 July 2005 equ 6 1 0 0 0 ovi 4 0 0 0 0 cap 8 0 0 0 0 New Mexico Rio Arriba f Chama 9 July 2005 equ 12 4 0 0 0 New Mexico Sandoval f Algodones 29 June 2005 equ 2 1 0 0 0 New Mexico Sandoval f Corrales 5 July 2005 equ 2 1 0 0 0 New Mexico Valencia f Belen 4 July 2005 bov 1 1 0 0 0 equ 5 0 0 0 0 New Mexico Valencia f Belen 6 July 2005 equ 3 3 0 0 0 Utah Duchesne f Neola 3 July 2005 equ 2 1 0 0 0 Utah Duchesne f Roosevelt 2 July 2005 bov 47 4 0 0 0 Utah San Juan f Bluff 11 July 2005 equ 1 1 0 0 0 Utah San Juan f Moab 30 June 2005 equ 6 1 0 0 0 Utah Grand f Moab 10 July 2005 equ 29 1 0 0 0 Utah Grand f Moab 11 July 2005 equ 2 1 0 0 0 cap 1 0 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Ballard 29 June 2005 equ 4 2 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Ballard 6 July 2005 equ 2 0 0 0 0 bov 60 1 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Duchesne 5 July 2005 equ 7 1 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Duchesne 11 July 2005 equ 23 1 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Gusher 8 July 2005 equ 5 1 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Jensen 2 July 2005 bov 20 4 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Jensen 10 July 2005 equ 4 1 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Jensen 13 July 2005 equ 11 2 0 0 0 bov 5 0 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Lapoint 10 July 2005 equ 5 1 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Randlett 6 July 2005 bov 800 2 0 0 0 equ 8 0 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Vernal 4 July 2005 equ 3 1 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Vernal 8 July 2005 equ 5 1 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Vernal 10 July 2005 equ 12 0 0 0 0 bov 15 1 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Vernal 11 July 2005 equ 6 1 0 0 0 f = farm
Diagnosis:
Laboratories where diagnosis was made Species examined Diagnostic tests used Dates Results Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory, Plum Island, New York bov virus isolation 14 July 2005 positive complement fixation test 15, 23 July 2005 positive National Veterinary Services Laboratories, Ames, Iowa equ virus isolation 15, 19, 22 July 2005 positive complement fixation test 16, 23 July 2005 positive Source of outbreaks or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive.
Control measures undertaken:
- control of arthropods;
- quarantine;
- on-going surveillance activities are being performed by APHIS Veterinary Services and Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas(1) and Utah State Departments of Agriculture personnel.
Treatment of affected animals: no.
Vaccination prohibited: yes.
(1) Note: no new vesicular stomatitis-positive premises have been reported in Texas since May 2005.
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* *NEWCASTLE DISEASE IN ISRAEL
See also: 4 November 2005, 28 October 2005, 28 October 2005, 14 October 2005, 16 September 2005, 2 September 2005, 12 August 2005
(Date of previous outbreak of Newcastle disease in Israel reported to the OIE: May 2005).
Immediate notification report
Information received on 24 July 2005 from Dr Moshe Chaimovitz, Director of Veterinary and Animal Health Services, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Beit-Dagan:
Report date: 24 July 2005.
Reason for immediate notification: re-occurrence of a listed disease or infection in a country or zone/compartment following a report declaring the outbreak ended.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 17 July 2005.
Date of start of the event: 13 July 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.
Details of outbreak:
First administrative division Lower administrative division Type of epide-miolo-gical unit Name of the location Spe-cies Number of animals in the outbreak susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered Acco ... village Peqi'in Hadasha avi 8,000 60 50 7,950 0 Description of affected population: two flock units of table egg layers were affected.
Diagnosis:
Laboratories where diagnosis was made Diagnostic tests used Date Results Tsfat regional poultry disease laboratory ... ... ... Kimron Veterinary Institute haemagglutination inhibition test ... ... pathogen isolation by egg inoculation 17 July 2005 positive PCR(1) 19 July 2005 positive intracerebral pathogenicity index (ICPI) test in progress pending Source of outbreak or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive.
Control measures undertaken:
- the flock was destroyed on 22 July 2005;
- all poultry holdings in the three villages within a radius of 3 km of the outbreak were checked serologically and/or clinically for Newcastle disease;
- orders were issued to the owners of all poultry and other avian species within a radius of 10 km to perform an immediate booster vaccination (using live vaccine by spray - VH strain ICPI 0.15);
- disinfection of infected premises;
- movement control inside the country.
Vaccination prohibited: no. Newcastle vaccination is compulsory in Israel.
(1) PCR: polymerase chain reaction
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* *HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN RUSSIA
See also: 30 December 2005, 21 October 2005, 14 October 2005, 26 August 2005, 12 August 2005, 5 August 2005
Immediate notification report
Translation of information received on 24 July 2005 from Dr Evgueny A. Nepoklonov, Head of the Main Veterinary Department, Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Moscow:
Report date: 24 July 2005 (see also Disease Information, 18 [29], 212, dated 22 July 2005).
Precise identification of agent: influenza virus type A. The haemagglutinin subtype has been preliminarily identified (from pathological material) as H5. After confirmation by virus isolation a separate notification will be sent. Tests are being performed to determine the neuraminidase type.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 23 July 2005.
Date of start of the event: 18 July 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.
Details of outbreaks:
First administrative division Lower administrative division Type of epide-miolo-gical unit Name of the location Date of start of the outbreak Spe-cies Number of animals in the outbreaks susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered Novosibirsk region (Novosibirskaya oblast) Kupino village ... 18 July 2005 avi ... ... ... ... ... Dovolnoye village ... 22 July 2005 avi ... ... ... ... ... Chistoozernoye village ... 22 July 2005 avi ... ... ... ... ... Description of affected populations: chickens, turkeys, ducks and geese in backyard holdings in nine villages.
Diagnosis:
Laboratory where diagnosis was made Diagnostic tests used Date Results Federal Centre for Animal Health (ARRIAH) - ELISA(1) (for antigen detection);
- PCR(2) (M-protein gene);
- haemagglutination test.
23 July 2005 positive Source of outbreaks or origin of infection: an epidemiological analysis has shown that the disease started in a flock in contact with wild waterfowl at open water reservoirs. This is proposed as the primary source of the virus. In addition, there are reports of the disease in wild birds.
Control measures undertaken:
- stamping out;
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- screening;
- zoning;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishments.
Vaccination prohibited: yes.
Other details/comments:
- Considering the low mortality rate (from 1% to 2.6% depending on the locality), the virus titres are very high in some samples of pathological material.
- No signs of the disease have appeared in commercial poultry farms in the region.
- The reasons for the disease’s lack of species specificity are still unclear. Bacteriological and toxicological tests of samples of water and soil from around the water and feeding points in the affected areas are continuing.
- Newcastle disease virus was not found in samples from the affected areas.
(1) ELISA: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
(2) PCR: polymerase chain reaction
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* *CLASSICAL SWINE FEVER IN SOUTH AFRICA
Follow-up report No. 1See also: 16 December 2005, 16 September 2005, 19 August 2005, 15 July 2005
Information received on 27 July 2005 from Dr Botlhe Modisane, Senior Manager of Animal Health, National Department of Agriculture, Pretoria:
End of previous report period: 12 July 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [28], 201, dated 15 July 2005).
End of this report period: 26 July 2005.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 8 July 2005.
Date of start of the event: 13 June 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.
Details of outbreaks (data corrected and updated):
First administrative division (province) Lower administrative division Type of epide-miolo-gical unit Name of the location Date of start of the outbreak Spe-cies Number of animals in the outbreaks susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered Western Cape Worcester farm Bonne Esperance 9 July 2005 sui 177 ... 15 162 0 Western Cape Worcester farm Buffelskraal 9 July 2005 sui 1,911 ... 774 1,137 0 Western Cape Worcester village De Doorns 9 July 2005 sui 25 3* 0 25 0 Western Cape Worcester village Hex River Valley 9 July 2005 sui 181 0 0 181 0 Western Cape Worcester village Lille 9 July 2005 sui 36 2* 0 36 0 Western Cape Worcester village Zwelletemba 9 July 2005 sui 51 9* 0 51 0 * no clinical disease detected; diagnosed on serology
Description of affected populations:
- Two commercial piggeries (at Bonne Esperance and Buffelskraal) with Landrace pigs.
- Three informal settlements (De Doorns, Lille and Zwelletemba) with mixed breeds.
In addition, all the pigs in several smallholdings (one to two pigs per holding) within Hex River Valley where collected and destroyed, even though no disease could be detected.
Diagnosis:
Laboratories where diagnosis was made Diagnostic tests used Date Results Provincial Veterinary Laboratory, Stellenbosch, South Africa - clinical examination ;
- macro- and histopathology;
- cross-reaction with bovine virus diarrhoea (BVD) antigen.
5 July 2005 typical pathology; positive cross-reaction with BVD Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute, South Africa antibody ELISA(1) 8 July 2005 positive Institute of Virology, Hanover Veterinary School, Germany RT-PCR(2) 16 July 2005 positive VLA Weybridge, United Kingdom RT-PCR(2) 19 July 2005 positive Sequencing results still pending.
Source of outbreaks: unknown or inconclusive.
Control measures undertaken:
- Road blocks and movement control are still being enforced. A total embargo on movement of pigs and pig products from the affected area is still in place.
- Stamping out was applied. All the cadavers of pigs were buried in trenches and covered with lime.
Sequence of operations
Stamping out Cleaning and first disinfection Buffelskraal 8-10 July 2005 16-17 July 2005 Bonne Esperance 12 July 2005 16-17 July 2005 De Doorns 14 July 2005 to be completed this week Hex River Valley 14 July 2005 started on 25 July 2005 Zwelletemba 14 July 2005 to be completed this week Lille 26 July 2005 to be completed this week Vaccination prohibited: yes.
Other details/comments:
Trace-back investigations on the possible origin of the disease led to the retesting of duplicate samples from pigs that died on a smallholding in the Worcester area in October 2004 from a disease that could not be identified at the time. In 2004, samples from these animals tested negative for porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS); African swine fever (ASF) had been suspected on the basis of histopathology but samples subsequently tested negative. The Western Cape is about 2,000 km south of the endemic ASF area. The duplicate samples now tested positive for classical swine fever (CSF).
All other duplicate samples kept from the PRRS outbreak in 2004 in the Western Cape were also tested for CSF, with negative results.
(1) ELISA: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
(2) RT-PCR: reverse transcriptase - polymerase chain reaction
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* *AVIAN INFLUENZA IN JAPAN
Follow-up report No. 1See also: 27 July 2006, 19 January 2006, 9 December 2005, 18 November 2005, 11 November 2005, 23 September 2005, 26 August 2005
Information received on 28 July 2005 from Dr Hirofumi Kugita, Chief Veterinary Officer, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Tokyo:
End of previous report period: 27 June 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [26], 176, dated 1 July 2005).
End of this report period: 15 July 2005.
Precise identification of agent: low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus type H5N2.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 26 June 2005.
Date of start of the event: 24 June 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: laboratory. The affected populations showed little or no clinical signs of the disease.
Details of outbreaks (data corrected and updated):
First administrative division (prefecture) Lower administrative division Type of epide-miolo-gical unit Date of start of the outbreak Spe-cies Number of animals in the outbreak susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered Ibaraki Mitsukaido city farm 24 June 2005 avi 24,504 ... ... 24,504 ... Ibaraki Mitsukaido city farm* 26 June 2005 avi 123,975 ... ... 123,975 ... Ibaraki Bando city farm 26 June 2005 avi 8,486 ... ... 8,486 ... * 5 farms
Diagnosis:
Laboratory where diagnosis was made Diagnostic tests used Date Results National Institute of Animal Health
(national reference laboratory)- agar gel precipitation test;
- PCR(1);
- pathogen isolation by egg inoculation.
... positive intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) test 9 July 2005 0.0 Source of outbreak or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive.
Control measures undertaken:
- movement control on infected farms and on farms within a 5-km radius of the infected farms;
- stamping out: all chickens on the seven farms (including the index farm) where diagnostic tests were positive have already been destroyed;
- disinfection of infected premises;
- on-site investigations on farms within a 5-km radius of the infected farms;
- the breeding farms where infected chickens were hatched have been investigated, with negative results.
Vaccination prohibited: yes.
(1) PCR: polymerase chain reaction
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* *NEWCASTLE DISEASE IN FRANCE
Follow-up report No. 1See also: 9 November 2006, 12 October 2006, 23 December 2005, 9 December 2005, 25 November 2005, 18 November 2005, 11 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 28 October 2005, 26 August 2005, 5 August 2005, 22 July 2005
Translation of information received on 27 July 2005 from Dr Monique Eloit, Deputy Director General, General Directorate for Food (DGAL), Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Fisheries and Rural Affairs, Paris:
End of previous report period: 19 July 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [29], 205, dated 22 July 2005).
End of this report period: 27 July 2005.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 19 July 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical and laboratory.
Details of outbreak (updated data):
First administrative division (department) Lower administrative division (municipality) Type of epide-miolo-gical unit Spe-cies Number of animals in the outbreak susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered Loire-Atlantique St-Mars-de-Coutais farm avi approx. 55,000* ... ... approx. 55,000* ... * approximately 35,000 partridges and 20,000 pheasants
Diagnosis:
Laboratories where diagnosis was made Diagnostic tests used Date Results Côtes-d'Armor Department Laboratory haemagglutination inhibition test 19 July 2005 positive; geometric mean titre: 217.5 AFSSA(1) Ploufragan (national reference laboratory) molecular sequencing 26 July 2005 presence of a virulent sequence Viral cultures are being carried out on embryonated eggs in order to isolate the virus and determine its intracerebral pathogenicity index.
Source of outbreak or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive (contact with wild animals?).
Control measures undertaken:
- Stamping-out policy was applied on 20-21 July 2005 on both units where the affected farm is located.
- A 3-km radius protection zone and a 10-km radius surveillance zone were set up. Poultry movements out of these zones have been prohibited. In addition, in the protection zone, poultry flocks are being subjected to veterinary inspections and to sampling in order to carry out serological tests. These measures had largely been implemented as a precautionary step from 15 July.
Other details/comments: the preliminary results of the investigations carried out around the outbreak indicate the absence of clinical signs in the neighbouring farms.
Newcastle disease in France
Additional informationInformation received on 27 July 2005 from Dr Monique Eloit, Deputy Director General, General Directorate for Food (DGAL), Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Fisheries and Rural Affairs, Paris:
Report date: 27 July 2005.
1. Initial detection of disease
On 15 July 2005, the French authorities were informed by the British authorities of a confirmed outbreak of Newcastle disease (ND) on a pheasant farm in Surrey, England. The French authorities immediately launched an epidemiological investigation to determine whether French farms could be at risk.
The results of this investigation revealed that five farms located in two French départements - one in Loire-Atlantique and four in Vendée - had supplied the affected English farm with pheasants in three consignments between 21 June 2005 and 5 July 2005. The five farms were immediately blocked and placed under surveillance.
Also on 15 July 2005, veterinary inspections as well as serological and virological sampling were conducted on these farms.
These veterinary inspections did not reveal any clinical signs at the Vendée farms or in the area surrounding the Loire-Atlantique farm. However, some mild and nonspecific clinical signs were observed in a small number of animals at the suspect farm, where only pheasants and partridges are bred.
To date, positive serological test results have only been obtained in the Loire-Atlantique farm. Virological tests are still underway, and the preliminary results have all been negative. Final results will be available in early August.
Alongside these tests, the relevant national laboratory (AFSSA Ploufragan) carried out molecular sequencing of fragments of genetic material which revealed that the protein sequence for fusion site F and surrounding the cleavage site is RRQRRF, indicating a virulent strain of avian paramyxovirus 1. These laboratory results led the French authorities to notify the OIE and the European Commission of an ND outbreak at the Loire-Atlantique farm. The sequence identified is very similar to viruses of the phylogenic line of the 5b group.
2. Chronology
Date Series of events and analyses 20 June 3,500 young pheasants from two farms in the Vendée département were exported to Surrey, in the south of England. 22 June 2,500 young pheasants from a farm in the Loire-Atlantique département were exported to Surrey. 4 July 2,700 young pheasants from two farms in the Vendée département were exported to Surrey. 15 July British authorities issued information on the suspected ND occurrence in the United Kingdom and its epidemiological link to France. 15 July The five implicated Vendée and Loire-Atlantique farms were blocked and placed under surveillance. 15 July Veterinary inspections were conducted in the farms involved and samples were collected for serological and virological testing. 18 July (evening) The serological results were positive for the Loire-Atlantique farm and negative for the other farms. 19 July Notification to the OIE: strong suspicion of ND. Situation presented to the European Commission and the Member States. No special European Union safeguard measures were deemed necessary. 20 and 21 July Preventive culling of 55,000 animals on the Loire Atlantique farm. 21 July First intermediate result of the virological analysis was negative for the Loire-Atlantique farm. 22 July First virological results were negative for the Vendée farms. 26 July (evening) Molecular sequencing: Identification of a virulent sequence (APMV1). 27 July Notification to the OIE and the European Commission of an ND outbreak. 3. Measures taken in France
3.1. The five farms were blocked and placed under surveillance as of 15 July 2005. Following negative serological and virological results, and in the absence of clinical signs for the four Vendée farms, this restriction was lifted on 26 July. It remains in force at the Loire-Atlantique farm.
3.2. Following positive serological results, and as a preventive measure, the Loire-Atlantique farm’s 55,000 animals, located on two sites, were culled on 20 and 21 July. Disinfection was carried out from 22 July to 25 July.
3.3. All farms belonging to the same poultry cooperative company were placed under official control, along with the 19 farms located within a 3-km radius of the infected farm (the protection zone) and the 59 farms within a 10-km radius (the surveillance zone). In the protection zone, poultry farms are blocked and must undergo veterinary inspections and serological tests. In the surveillance zone, only restriction of animal movement is applied. These measures had largely been implemented as a precautionary step from 15 July.
4. Control of intra-Community trade and exports
As concerns the movements of poultry products defined by Article 2.7.13.4. of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code, even before the outbreak in the Loire-Atlantique département was confirmed, France, with the agreement of the European Commission, decided to implement the following precautionary measures:
4.1. Intra-Community trade: Intra-Community trade is not subject to restrictive measures unless it originates from the Loire-Atlantique département, where trade is temporarily suspended pending the conclusions of the epidemiological investigation.
4.2. Exports to third countries: Certification for the export of French poultry products to other countries was suspended. In response to favourable developments, certification was reauthorised as of 21 July for exports to countries that do not require ND free status for France, with the exception of poultry products from the Loire-Atlantique département.
5. Epidemiological investigations
5.1. Possible sources of infection:
The precise source of the disease is unknown at this stage but a link with avifauna cannot be ruled out given the infected farm's close proximity to a lake known for its migratory bird population. This is the most likely hypothesis, but all potentially infectious epidemiological contacts must be considered, in particular the movement of humans, equipment, and vehicles.
The epidemiological investigations are ongoing.
5.2. Potential risks of spreading:
The Loire-Atlantique farm is located in an area where mainly game birds are bred; there is no nearby large-scale domestic poultry farm, hatchery, or breeder.
The 3-km protection zone contains 19 farms, which are currently undergoing veterinary inspections and serological sampling. No clinical signs of ND have been detected. Sampling is now underway.
The 10-km surveillance zone contains 59 farms. No clinical signs of ND have been found thus far.
No animal has left the affected farm for any location in France, the European Union, or any other country since 1 June, with the exception of the 22 June shipment to the United Kingdom. In addition, all farms under surveillance have been blocked. No poultry products may leave them as long as surveillance measures remain in place.
5.3. Summary of the situation:
Although the ND outbreak in France was confirmed on 27 July, all protective and control measures had been pre-emptively put in place as of 15 July. Moreover, an epidemiological investigation determined that no potentially infected poultry product was exported or traded, even considering an extended security period starting on 1 June.
(1) AFSSA: Agence française de sécurité sanitaire des aliments (French Agency for Food Safety)
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* *HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN THAILAND
Follow-up report No. 62See also: 16 November 2006, 3 August 2006, 27 July 2006, 6 April 2006, 16 February 2006, 2 February 2006, 26 January 2006, 19 January 2006, 12 January 2006, 23 December 2005, 16 December 2005, 9 December 2005, 2 December 2005, 25 November 2005, 18 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 28 October 2005, 21 October 2005, 14 October 2005, 7 October 2005, 30 September 2005, 23 September 2005, 16 September 2005, 9 September 2005, 2 September 2005, 26 August 2005, 19 August 2005, 12 August 2005, 22 July 2005, 15 July 2005
Information received on 29 July 2005 from Dr Yukol Limlamthong, Director General, Department of Livestock Development (DLD), Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Bangkok:
End of previous report period: 20 July 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [29], 207, dated 22 July 2005).
End of this report period: 28 July 2005.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 23 January 2004.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.
Details of outbreak:
First administrative division (province) Lower administrative division Type of epide-miolo-gical unit Name of the location Date of start of the outbreak Spe-cies Number of animals in the outbreak susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered SuphanBuri Banpoh, Muang village village No. 8 19 July 2005 avi 19 4 4 15 ... SuphanBuri DonKa, U Tong village village No. 8 20 July 2005 avi 30 1 1 ... ... Kampaengphet PohTong, PangSilathong village village No. 3 21 July 2005 avi 28 9 2 26 ... SuphanBuri U Tong, U Tong village village No. 1 22 July 2005 avi 32 5 5 27 ... Description of affected population in the new outbreaks: village chickens which were free ranging or with minimal biosecurity.
Diagnosis:
Laboratories where diagnosis was made Diagnostic tests used Results National Institute of Animal Health and Regional Veterinary Research and Development Centres, DLD - agar-gel precipitation test;
- haemagglutination test;
- pathogen isolation by egg inoculation;
- intracerebral pathogenicity index test.
positive Source of new outbreaks: unknown or inconclusive.
Control measures undertaken:
- stamping out;
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- screening;
- zoning;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishments.
Vaccination prohibited: yes.
Other details/comments: the case findings resulted from the second nationwide active surveillance campaign, being conducted from 1 to 31 July 2005. The purpose of this surveillance is to evaluate the present status of highly pathogenic avian influenza after the second wave of outbreaks (between 3 July 2004 and 12 April 2005).
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