[top]Disease Information
18 November 2005
Vol. 18 - No. 46Contents
FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE IN BRAZIL
Follow-up report No. 9See also: 26 October 2006, 14 September 2006, 27 July 2006, 22 June 2006, 1 June 2006, 25 May 2006, 27 April 2006, 20 April 2006, 6 April 2006, 16 March 2006, 23 February 2006, 2 February 2006, 19 January 2006, 12 January 2006, 23 December 2005, 9 December 2005, 2 December 2005, 18 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 28 October 2005, 28 October 2005, 28 October 2005, 21 October 2005, 21 October 2005, 14 October 2005, 14 October 2005
Translation of information received on 10 November 2005 from Dr Jorge Caetano Junior, Director, Department of Animal Protection (DDA), Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply, Brasilia:
End of previous report period: 3 November 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [44], 403, dated 4 November 2005).
End of this report period: 10 November 2005.
Precise identification of agent: foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus serotype O.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 8 October 2005.
Date of start of the event: 26 September 2005.
Surveillance activities in the State of Mato Grosso do Sul have led to the detection of a new outbreak, diagnosed on clinical and epidemiological grounds, in Japorã municipality. The owner of the affected farm notified the official Veterinary Service on 7 November 2005 and the farm was immediately placed under quarantine. Samples were taken and sent to the LANAGRO-PA(1) laboratory for analysis.
Details of outbreak:
First administrative division (State) Lower administrative division (municipality) Type of epidemiological unit Latitude Longitude Date of start of the outbreak Species Number of animals in the outbreak susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered Mato Grosso do Sul Japorã farm 23º46’15.5” S 54 31’26.9” W 3 Nov. 2005 bov 902 18* 0 0 0 * animals presenting clinical signs compatible with FMD
Description of affected population in the new outbreak: fattening cattle.
Source of new outbreak: unknown or inconclusive (investigations in progress).
Control measures
A. Undertaken:
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- screening;
- zoning.
B. To be undertaken:
- stamping out;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishment(s).
Treatment of affected animals: no.
Other details/comments:
1. Outbreaks in the State of Mato Grosso do Sul:
After 40 days of work to contain and eliminate the FMD outbreaks registered in the southern region of the State of Mato Grosso do Sul, the disease is now confined to the buffer zones established around the outbreaks.
Surveillance measures continue to be implemented, with the municipalities of Eldorado, Iguatemi, Itaquiraí, Japorã and Mundo Novo remaining under a ban. In the latter municipalities, there continues to be a ban on the movement and marketing of FMD-susceptible animals and their products and by-products, with 21 control posts having been set up.
To date, 810 rural holdings have been inspected and placed under a ban, involving a total of 135,616 animals. A total of 23 outbreaks have been detected and 5,103 FMD-susceptible animals slaughtered and destroyed.
The report on animal movements during the past 60 days in the municipalities currently under a ban was sent to all units in the Federation and the holdings that received these animals are under intensive surveillance.
2. Suspected outbreaks in the State of Paraná:
On 21 October 2005, the Animal Health Department received reports of suspected vesicular disease in the State of Paraná, in four holdings in the municipalities of Loanda, Amaporã, Grandes Rios and Maringá(2).
By the 19th day after the suspected outbreak of vesicular disease was notified, 672 rural holdings had been inspected and placed under a ban, involving the inspection of 89,101 FMD-susceptible animals. Eleven control posts have been set up. During the same period, 5 further holdings presented animals with clinical signs of vesicular disease(3), giving a total of 9 suspected outbreaks in the State (4 in Loanda, 2 in Amaporã, 2 in Maringá and 1 in Grandes Rios).
Sanitary measures adopted:
- ban on holdings;
- ban on 32 municipalities with areas located within a 10-km radius of suspected outbreaks in the State of Paraná;
- ban on 5 municipalities with areas located within a 25-km radius of outbreaks in the State of Mato Grosso do Sul;
- establishment of control posts and implementation of biosafety measures, with access restricted to everyone except professionals and officials working on FMD control;
- clinical inspection of all animals in the holdings;
- epidemiological research to ascertain the origin of the disease.
The restriction on the movement of FMD-susceptible animals and their products and by-products was made legally enforceable.
Final report: no.
(1) LANAGRO-PA: National Agricultural Defence Laboratory, Belém, Pará
(2) See Follow-up report No. 5
(3) See Follow-up report No. 7
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* *FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE IN BRAZIL
Follow-up report No. 10See also: 26 October 2006, 14 September 2006, 27 July 2006, 22 June 2006, 1 June 2006, 25 May 2006, 27 April 2006, 20 April 2006, 6 April 2006, 16 March 2006, 23 February 2006, 2 February 2006, 19 January 2006, 12 January 2006, 23 December 2005, 9 December 2005, 2 December 2005, 18 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 28 October 2005, 28 October 2005, 28 October 2005, 21 October 2005, 21 October 2005, 14 October 2005, 14 October 2005
Translation of information received on 17 November 2005 from Dr Jorge Caetano Junior, Director, Department of Animal Protection (DDA), Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply, Brasilia:
End of previous report period: 10 November 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [46], 429, dated 18 November 2005).
End of this report period: 17 November 2005.
Precise identification of agent: foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus serotype O.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 8 October 2005.
Date of start of the event: 26 September 2005.
Surveillance activities in the State of Mato Grosso do Sul have led to the detection of a new outbreak, diagnosed on clinical and epidemiological grounds, in Japorã municipality. The official Veterinary Service was notified on 10 November 2005 and the holding was immediately placed under quarantine. Samples were taken and sent to the LANAGRO-PA(1) laboratory for analysis.
Details of outbreak:
First administrative division (State) Lower administrative division (municipality) Type of epidemiological unit Latitude Longitude Date of start of the outbreak Species Number of animals in the outbreak susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered Mato Grosso do Sul Japorã farm 23 46’22.1” S 54 36’47.6” O 1 Nov. 2005 bov 2 2* 0 0 0 * animals presenting clinical signs compatible with FMD
Description of affected population in the new outbreak: cattle reared for subsistence purposes.
Source of new outbreak: unknown or inconclusive (investigations in progress).
Control measures
A. Undertaken:
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- screening;
- zoning.
B. To be undertaken:
- stamping out;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishment(s).
Treatment of affected animals: no.
Other details/comments:
After 48 days of work to contain and eliminate the FMD outbreaks registered in the southern region of the State of Mato Grosso do Sul, the disease is now confined to the buffer zones established around the outbreaks.
Surveillance measures continue to be implemented, with the municipalities of Eldorado, Iguatemi, Itaquiraí, Japorã and Mundo Novo remaining under a ban. In the latter municipalities, there continues to be a ban on the movement and marketing of FMD-susceptible animals and their products and by-products, with 23 control posts having been set up.
A total of 24 outbreaks have been detected and 12,006 FMD-susceptible animals slaughtered and destroyed.
The report on animal movements during the past 60 days in the municipalities currently under a ban was sent to all units in the Federation and the holdings that received these animals are under intensive surveillance.
Final report: no.
(1) LANAGRO-PA: National Agricultural Defence Laboratory, Belém, Pará
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* *AVIAN INFLUENZA IN JAPAN
Follow-up report No. 5See also: 27 July 2006, 19 January 2006, 9 December 2005, 11 November 2005, 23 September 2005, 26 August 2005, 29 July 2005
Information received on 11 November 2005 from Dr Hirofumi Kugita, Chief Veterinary Officer, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Tokyo:
End of previous report period: 4 November 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [45], 419, dated 11 November 2005).
End of this report period: 11 November 2005.
Precise identification of agent: low pathogenic avian influenza virus subtype H5N2.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 26 June 2005.
Date of start of the event: 24 June 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: laboratory.
Details of new outbreak:
First administrative division (Prefecture) Lower administrative division Type of epidemiological unit Date of start of the outbreak Species Number of animals in the outbreak susceptible cases* deaths destroyed slaugh-tered Ibaraki Ogawa municipality farm 7 Nov. 2005 avi 950,000 0 0 0 0 * No clinical signs have been detected.
Description of affected population in the new outbreak: chickens.
Diagnosis:
Laboratories where diagnostic tests were performed Diagnostic tests used Date Results National Institute of Animal Health (national reference laboratory) - agar gel precipitation test;
- haemagglutination inhibition test.
between 1 and 5 November 2005 positive Livestock Hygiene Service Center in Ibaraki Prefecture virus isolation between 1 and 5 November 2005 positive Source of outbreak or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive.
Control measures
A. Undertaken:
- quarantine;
- movement control on farms within a radius of 5 km of the infected farms;
- screening;
- zoning;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishments.
B. To be undertaken:
- all chickens in farms where the infection has been confirmed, except for those kept in premises with strict biosecurity facilities, are to be destroyed.
Vaccination prohibited: yes.
Other details/comments: the subtype of the virus in the outbreaks reported in Follow-up report No. 4 has been confirmed as H5N2.
Final report: no.
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* *AMERICAN FOULBROOD IN CHILE
Follow-up report No. 2See also: 30 March 2006, 2 March 2006, 26 January 2006, 12 January 2006, 23 December 2005, 16 December 2005, 9 December 2005, 2 December 2005, 25 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 28 October 2005
Translation of information received on 11 November 2005 from Dr Hernan Rojas Olavarria, Head, Department of Animal Protection, Department of Agriculture and Animal Production (SAG), Ministry of Agriculture, Santiago:
End of previous report period: 2 November 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [44], 412, dated 4 November 2005).
End of this report period: 11 November 2005.
Precise identification of agent: Paenibacillus larvae subsp. larvae.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 20 October 2005.
Date of start of the event: 15 October 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical and laboratory.
Details of new outbreaks:
First administrative division Lower administrative divisions Type of epidemiological unit Name of the location (sector) Latitude Longitude Date of start of the outbreak Species Number of animals* in the outbreaks suscep-tible cases destroyed VII Region Curicó, Rauco district apiary El Parrón 35 6´5.2708”S 71 23´26.9982”W 20 Oct. 2005 api 48 8 48 VII Region Curicó, Rauco district apiary El Parrón 35 6´5.2708”S 71 23´26.9982”W 20 Oct. 2005 api 67 10 67 VII Region Curicó, Curicó district apiary Zapallar 35 3´12.0677”S 71 8´19.3319”W 20 Oct. 2005 api 84 6 84 VII Region Curicó, Curicó district apiary Las Piedras 35 3´13.4468”S 71 7´6.3130”W 20 Oct. 2005 api 22 3 22 * hives
Diagnosis:
Laboratory where diagnostic tests were performed Diagnostic tests used Date Results Department of Laboratories and Plant and Animal Quarantine Stations, Lo Aguirre, Santiago de Chile (official SAG laboratory) PCR(1) 2 Nov. 2005 positive Source of new outbreaks: contact with affected hives.
Control measures undertaken:
- quarantine;
- partial stamping out for affected apiaries in V Region(2) and stamping out for affected apiaries in VII Region;
- movement control inside the country.
- zoning.
Final report: no.
(1) PCR: polymerase chain reaction
(2) See Follow-up report No. 1
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* *HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN CHINA (PEOPLE'S REP. OF ~)
Follow-up report No. 8See also: 5 October 2006, 17 August 2006, 27 July 2006, 6 July 2006, 22 June 2006, 8 June 2006, 9 February 2006, 12 January 2006, 5 January 2006, 16 December 2005, 2 December 2005, 25 November 2005, 11 November 2005, 11 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 28 October 2005, 21 October 2005, 12 August 2005
Information received on 11, 14, 15 and 17 November 2005 from Mr Jia Youling, Director General, Veterinary Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture, Beijing:
End of previous report period: 10 November 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [45], 427, dated 11 November 2005).
End of this report period: 17 November 2005.
Precise identification of agent: highly pathogenic avian influenza virus subtype H5N1.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 7 June 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.
Details of the new outbreaks:
First administrative division Lower administrative division Type of epidemiological unit Name of the location Date of start of the outbreak Species Number of animals in the outbreaks susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered AnHui province Huainan city village Fanxu 6 Nov. 2005 avi 1,800 800 800 1,000 0 Hubei province Jingshan county village Xinshi 2 Nov. 2005 avi 3,550 2,500 2,500 1,050 0 Hubei province Xiaogan city village Maochenzhen 5 Nov. 2005 avi 3,384 1,400 1,400 1,984 0 Xinjiang autonomous region Hetian city village Gujiangbage 10 Nov. 2005 avi 2,500 32 32 2,468 0 Xinjiang autonomous region Urumchi county village Beidalu 9 Nov. 2005 avi 5,200 1,400 1,400 3,800 0 Xinjiang autonomous region Zepu county village The first community 9 Nov. 2005 avi 1,347 1,347 1,347 0 0 Description of affected population in the new outbreaks: chickens and ducks.
Diagnosis:
Laboratory where diagnostic tests were performed Diagnostic tests used Date Results Harbin Veterinary Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Harbin (national reference laboratory for avian influenza) - haemagglutination inhibition test;
- RT-PCR(1).
11-16 Nov. 2005 positive intravenous pathogenicity index (IVPI) test 11-16 Nov. 2005 positive (highly pathogenic) Source of new outbreaks: contact with wild birds.
Control measures undertaken:
- stamping out applied to birds in the outbreaks and culling of 558,638 birds in the area around the outbreaks;
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- screening;
- zoning;
- vaccination;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishments;
- dipping/spraying.
Vaccination in response to the outbreaks:
First administrative division Total number of birds vaccinated Details of the vaccine Hubei province 117,300 - monovalent inactivated vaccine against subtype H5N2;
- live recombinant fowlpox virus-vectored H5 vaccine.
AnHui province 279,699 - monovalent inactivated vaccine against subtype H5N2;
- live recombinant fowlpox virus-vectored H5 vaccine.
Final report: no.
(1) RT-PCR: reverse transcriptase - polymerase chain reaction
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* *HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN THAILAND
Follow-up report No. 76See also: 16 November 2006, 3 August 2006, 27 July 2006, 6 April 2006, 16 February 2006, 2 February 2006, 26 January 2006, 19 January 2006, 12 January 2006, 23 December 2005, 16 December 2005, 9 December 2005, 2 December 2005, 25 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 28 October 2005, 21 October 2005, 14 October 2005, 7 October 2005, 30 September 2005, 23 September 2005, 16 September 2005, 9 September 2005, 2 September 2005, 26 August 2005, 19 August 2005, 12 August 2005, 29 July 2005, 22 July 2005, 15 July 2005
Information received on 11 and 18 November 2005 from Dr Yukol Limlamthong, Director General, Department of Livestock Development (DLD), Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Bangkok:
End of previous report period: 3 November 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [44], 414, dated 4 November 2005).
End of this report period: 17 November 2005.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 23 January 2004.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.
Details of new outbreaks:
First administrative division (province) Lower administrative divisions Type of epidemiological unit Name of the location Date of start of the outbreak Species Number of animals in the outbreaks susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered NonthaBuri WatChalor, BangKruay village village No. 4 9 Nov. 2005 avi 86 1 1 85 0 SamutPrakan Preng, BangBoh village village No. 9 23 Oct. 2005 avi 45 13 13 32 0 SuphanBuri Jaedee, U Thong village village No. 5 2 Nov. 2005 avi 1,800 100 100 1,700 0 Description of affected population in the new outbreaks:
- Outbreaks in the provinces of NonthaBuri and SamutPrakan: native chickens.
- Outbreak in SuphanBuri province: Thai traditionally raised ducks.
Diagnosis:
Laboratory where diagnosis was made Diagnostic tests used Results National Institute of Animal Health and Regional Veterinary Research and Development Centres, DLD - agar-gel precipitation test;
- haemagglutination test;
- pathogen isolation by egg inoculation;
- intracerebral pathogenicity index test.
positive Source of new outbreaks: unknown or inconclusive.
Control measures undertaken:
- stamping out;
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- screening;
- zoning;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishments.
Vaccination prohibited: yes.
Other details/comments:
Thailand has been conducting the current nationwide surveillance since 1 July 2005.
In this third wave to date, there have been 75 confirmed outbreaks in 11 provinces, since the second wave of HPAI re-occurrence that occurred from 3 July 2004 to 12 April 2005:
Affected province No. of outbreaks AngThong 2 Ayudhaya 1 Chainat 1 Kalasin 2 KamphaengPhet 25 KanchanaBuri 6 NakhonPathom 4 NonthaBuri 3 SamutPrakan 1 Saraburi 5 SuphanBuri 25 Ten of the 11 affected provinces are in the Central Poultry Zone of Thailand (see details and map in Disease Information, 18 [35], 290-291, dated 2 September 2005). The other affected province, Kalasin, is in the North-Eastern Zone.
All cases involved either free-range poultry or poultry raised in farms with traditional husbandry practices with poor sanitation and inadequate biosecurity.
Affected population No. of outbreaks native poultry 54 quail 6 fighting cocks 5 broilers 4 ducks 4 laying hens 2 Final report: no.
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* *HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN TURKEY
Follow-up report No. 3See also: 17 August 2006, 18 May 2006, 11 May 2006, 27 April 2006, 20 April 2006, 13 April 2006, 6 April 2006, 30 March 2006, 23 March 2006, 9 March 2006, 2 March 2006, 2 March 2006, 23 February 2006, 2 February 2006, 26 January 2006, 19 January 2006, 12 January 2006, 30 December 2005, 9 December 2005, 28 October 2005, 14 October 2005, 14 October 2005
Information received on 14 November 2005 from Dr Nihat Pakdil, General Director of Protection and Control, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, Ankara:
End of previous report period: 20 October 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [43], 382, dated 28 October 2005).
End of this report period: 11 November 2005.
Collection of samples for serological surveillance in the surveillance zone has been completed. Testing activities are continuing.
Final report: no.
Note by the OIE Animal Health Information Department: No new outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza were reported during the period covered by this follow-up report.
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* *FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE IN CHINA (PEOPLE'S REP. OF ~)
Follow-up report No. 5 (final report)See also: 16 November 2006, 19 October 2006, 21 September 2006, 24 August 2006, 10 August 2006, 3 August 2006, 13 July 2006, 29 June 2006, 15 June 2006, 1 June 2006, 4 May 2006, 30 March 2006, 9 March 2006, 19 January 2006, 5 January 2006, 22 July 2005
Information received on 16 November 2005 from Mr Jia Youling, Director General, Veterinary Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture, Beijing:
End of previous report period: 20 July 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [29], 208, dated 22 July 2005).
End of this report period: 16 November 2005.
On 13 May 2005, two outbreaks of foot and mouth disease (FMD) caused by virus subtype Asia1 were reported in Shandong and Jiangsu provinces(1). Both outbreaks have been eradicated and quarantines in the affected areas have been lifted.
After the detection of suspected cases of FMD in Tai'an, Shandong province, and Wuxi, Jiangsu province, the local veterinary administrative departments promptly implemented blockades within a 3-km radius area around the infected areas. All the infected cattle and other cattle in the infected herds were destroyed, the affected areas were completely disinfected, movements of livestock were strictly controlled, and the animals in the threatened areas underwent emergency vaccination.
Serological surveillance with 3ABC-ELISA(2) was conducted for all susceptible animals in affected areas and threatened areas.
The local veterinary administrative departments in Shandong and Jiangsu provinces organised experts to evaluate the situation and considered that the two FMD outbreaks had been effectively eradicated, a prerequisite for the lifting of quarantine. The quarantines were then lifted by the veterinary administrative departments of Shandong and Jiangsu provinces.
Surveillance by the Ministry of Agriculture of the People's Republic of China during the six months since the last case was stamped out has shown no evidence of new cases in the two affected areas.
(1) See Immediate notification report
(2) ELISA: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
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* *HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN ROMANIA
Follow-up report No. 7See also: 2 March 2006, 23 February 2006, 16 February 2006, 19 January 2006, 5 January 2006, 30 December 2005, 23 December 2005, 16 December 2005, 9 December 2005, 2 December 2005, 2 December 2005, 25 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 28 October 2005, 21 October 2005, 21 October 2005, 14 October 2005, 14 October 2005
Information received on 16 November 2005 from Dr Gabriel Predoi, Director General, National Sanitary Veterinary and Food Safety Authority, Bucharest:
End of previous report period: 1 November 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [44], 405, dated 4 November 2005).
End of this report period: 16 November 2005.
Precise identification of agent: avian influenza virus subtype H5.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 7 October 2005.
Date of start of the event: 4 October 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical and laboratory.
Details of new outbreaks:
First administrative division (County) Lower administrative division (district) Type of epidemiological unit Name of the location Date of start of the outbreak Species Number of animals in the outbreaks susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered Tulcea Caraorman farm Caraorman 15 Nov. 2005 avi 36* 2 1 35 0 Tulcea Caraorman farm Caraorman 15 Nov. 2005 avi 28** 1 0 28 0 * 14 laying hens, 13 geese, 7 ducks and 2 turkeys
** 25 laying hens and 3 ducks
Diagnosis: the reasons for suspicion were clinical signs, the presence of Danube Delta territory around the affected village, and the presence of migratory birds around the outbreak area.
Laboratory where diagnostic tests were performed Birds examined Diagnostic tests used Date Results Institute for Diagnostics and Animal Health (national reference laboratory for avian influenza) 2 hens - virus isolation in SPF(1) chicken embryos;
- rapid test for antigen detection on allanto-amniotic fluid
15 Nov. 2005 positive 1 hen agar-gel immunodiffusion test 15 Nov. 2005 positive Source of new outbreaks: contact with wild birds.
Control measures undertaken:
- affected village placed under official control;
- stamping out applied to all birds within the affected village (culling of poultry by gassing with CO2 in containers; destruction of corpses by burning and burying);
- quarantine (all movement of people, poultry, poultry products, feed, etc., is prohibited; restriction measures are being applied to the entire affected village);
- disinfection of backyard premises and roads in the affected village.
Vaccination prohibited: no.
Final report: no.
(1) SPF: specific pathogen-free
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* *VESICULAR STOMATITIS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Follow-up report No. 24See also: 28 December 2006, 7 December 2006, 23 November 2006, 16 November 2006, 2 November 2006, 26 October 2006, 19 October 2006, 12 October 2006, 5 October 2006, 28 September 2006, 21 September 2006, 14 September 2006, 7 September 2006, 31 August 2006, 24 August 2006, 13 April 2006, 16 February 2006, 26 January 2006, 12 January 2006, 23 December 2005, 9 December 2005, 4 November 2005, 28 October 2005, 21 October 2005, 14 October 2005, 7 October 2005, 30 September 2005, 23 September 2005, 16 September 2005, 2 September 2005, 26 August 2005, 19 August 2005, 5 August 2005, 29 July 2005, 15 July 2005, 8 July 2005
Information received on 17 November 2005 from Dr Peter Fernandez, Associate Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Washington, DC:
End of previous report period: 30 October 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [44], 411, dated 4 November 2005).
End of this report period: 13 November 2005.
Precise identification of agent: vesicular stomatitis virus type New Jersey.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 27 April 2005.
Date of start of the event: 16 April 2005.
New outbreaks:
First administrative division (State) Lower administrative division (County) Type of epidemiological unit Name of the location Date of start of the outbreak Species Number of animals in the outbreaks susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered Colorado Eagle farm Burns 21 Oct 2005 equ 8 0 0 0 0 bov 250 1 0 0 0 Colorado Eagle farm Burns 22 Oct 2005 bov 250 1 0 0 0 equ 2 0 0 0 0 Colorado Garfield farm Rifle 27 Oct 2005 equ 20 1 0 0 0 Colorado Mesa farm Collbran 30 Oct 2005 equ 2 2 0 0 0 Colorado Mesa farm De Beque 25 Oct 2005 equ 4 1 0 0 0 Colorado Mesa farm Grand Junction 27 Oct 2005 equ 6 1 0 0 0 Colorado Montezuma farm Dolores 5 Oct 2005 equ 1 0 0 0 0 bov 19 1 0 0 0 Colorado Ouray farm Ridgeway 21 Oct 2005 bov 200 1 0 0 0 Montana Big Horn farm Hardin 5 Oct 2005 bov 200 4 0 0 0 Wyoming Natrona farm Casper 30 Oct 2005 equ 10 2 0 0 0 Wyoming Park farm Powel 7 Oct 2005 equ 1 0 0 0 0 bov 100 5 0 0 0 Wyoming Sweetwater farm McKinnen 10 Oct 2005 bov 500 3 0 0 0 Diagnosis:
Laboratories where diagnosis was made Species examined Diagnostic tests used Dates Results National Veterinary Services Laboratories, Ames, Iowa equ complement fixation test 4-10 Nov. 2005 positive virus isolation 4 November 2005 positive (virus type New Jersey) Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory, Plum Island, New York bov complement fixation test 4 November 2005 positive Source of outbreaks or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive (vectors?).
Control measures undertaken:
- control of arthropods;
- quarantine;
- on-going surveillance activities are being performed by APHIS Veterinary Services and Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Texas, Utah and Wyoming State Departments of Agriculture personnel.
Treatment of affected animals: no.
Vaccination prohibited: yes.
Other details/comments:
On 9 November 2005, the State of Nebraska released the quarantine on all three vesicular stomatitis premises in the State.
Final report: no.
Note: no new vesicular stomatitis-positive premises have been reported in Texas since May 2005, in Arizona since June 2005 and in New Mexico since August 2005.
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* *NEWCASTLE DISEASE IN FRANCE
Update on the situation as of 10 November 2005See also: 9 November 2006, 12 October 2006, 23 December 2005, 9 December 2005, 25 November 2005, 11 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 28 October 2005, 26 August 2005, 5 August 2005, 29 July 2005, 22 July 2005
Information received on 17 November 2005 from Dr Monique Eloit, Deputy Director General, General Directorate for Food (DGAL), Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Fisheries and Rural Affairs, Paris:
End of previous report period: 24 October 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [44], 399, dated 4 November 2005).
End of this report period: 10 November 2005.
An outbreak of Newcastle disease was confirmed on 21 October 2005, in a farm of 1,500 pheasants located in the municipality of Siracourt in the Pas-de-Calais département (maps).
The outbreak concerns a pheasant farm where the initial clinical signs appeared on 20 September 2005. Each year, the farm brings in a single batch of six-week-old pheasants and raises them with a view to releasing them for hunting purposes. The farm’s veterinarian initially suspected botulism. The establishment was placed under surveillance and all movement was prohibited as of 4 October. No animal had left the farm during the 21-day risk period preceding the onset of clinical signs.
After clinical signs of undetermined aetiology appeared on 20 September, the farm’s veterinarian carried out sampling to perform serological analyses on 27 September. The samples tested positive for Newcastle disease. Additional sampling on 4 October enabled the isolation, during the second embryonated egg passage, of avian paramyxovirus 1 (APMV1), pigeon variant. The intracerebral pathogenicity index (ICPI) was then found to be 1.61.
1. Chronology
Date Series of events and tests 20 September First clinical signs 27 September Sampling for serological testing 4 October Sampling for viral isolation 17 October Preventive culling of all pheasants on the premises 21 October Positive viral isolation during second passage. ICPI = 1.61 21 October Notification to OIE and European Commission; implementation of a 3-km protection zone and 10-km surveillance zone 22-24 October First series of veterinary visits to the protection and surveillance zones: no clinical signs observed 24 October Preliminary cleaning and disinfection of the infected farm 28 October Second series of veterinary visits (protection zone): no clinical signs observed 31 October Final cleaning and disinfection of the infected farm 4-7 November Third series of veterinary visits (protection and surveillance zones): no clinical signs observed 2. Measures taken in France
2.1. The Siracourt farm was blocked and placed under surveillance as of 4 October.
2.2. Following the test by the reference laboratory identifying haemagglutinating APMV1, pigeon variant, the Siracourt farm’s 1,500 animals were preventively culled on 17 October 2005. Preliminary disinfection operations were implemented on 24 October and final operations on 31 October.
2.3. The five farms within a 3-km radius (protection zone) and the 20 farms within a 10-km radius (surveillance zone) of the suspect farm were placed under official control. In the protection zone all poultry farms were blocked and have already undergone three veterinary visits with favourable results. In the surveillance zone, the following measures are in place:
2.3.1. ban on movement of poultry and hatching eggs out of the zone for the first 15 days;
2.3.2. ban on poultry transport except via major highways and railways;
2.3.3. ban on removing or spreading poultry droppings, bedding, or manure without authorisation;
2.3.4. ban on holding fairs, markets, exhibitions and other collections of poultry or birds;
2.3.5. ban on releasing game.
3. Control of intra-Community trade and exports
As concerns the movement of poultry products defined by Article 2.7.13.4. of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code, the following measures were taken in compliance with European Community regulations:
3.1. Intra-Community trade
Intra-Community trade originating in the 3-km protection zone and the 10-km surveillance zone has been suspended.
3.2. Exports to non-European Union member countries
Certification has been suspended for the export of French poultry products originating in the 3-km protection zone, the 10-km surveillance zone, and, if need be, zones defined by bilateral sanitary agreements.
4. Epidemiological investigation
4.1. Possible sources of infection
Given the date of the batch’s delivery (9 July 2005) and the date of the appearance of clinical signs (20 September 2005), the most likely hypothesis at this time is contamination by wild animals (presence of pigeons in the surrounding area).
The epidemiological investigation is still underway.
4.2. Potential risks of spreading
The risk period began on 30 August 2005 (21 days before the initial clinical signs).
The Siracourt farm is located in an area with a low farm density and without any hatchery.
Veterinary visits to the protection and surveillance zones have not detected any clinical signs of the disease.
The epidemiological investigation confirmed that no animals left the Siracourt farm during the risk period.
4.3. Summary of the situation
A Newcastle disease outbreak was confirmed in France on 21 October in a farm that was rearing a single batch of pheasants to be released for the autumn 2005 hunting season. Every protection measure has been put in place, including the preventive culling of all birds located in the infected farm as of 17 October 2005.
Moreover, the epidemiological investigation demonstrated that no contaminated avian product originating in the Siracourt infected farm was put on the French market, traded, or exported during the risk period. Health visits to farms within the protection and surveillance zones led to the conclusion that the disease had not spread.
A final series of health visits must take place before restrictions are lifted in these zones. If this final series of visits produces favourable results, the restrictions will be definitively lifted on 23 November, 30 days after the preliminary disinfection (in compliance with European Union legislation) and more than 21 days after the final disinfection (in compliance with the Terrestrial Animal Health Code). The French Authorities will then consider this incident to be over.
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* *MISCELLANEOUS: PIG DISEASE INVESTIGATIONS IN AUSTRALIA (Follow-up report No. 1)
See also: 16 November 2006, 9 November 2006, 29 June 2006, 8 July 2005
Information received on 10 November 2005 from Dr Gardner Murray, Chief Veterinary Officer, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Australia (AFFA), Canberra:
End of previous report period: 6 July 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [27], 196, dated 8 July 2005).
End of this report period: 10 November 2005.
Ongoing surveillance in the farm in New South Wales has revealed no evidence of the characteristic clinical signs of ‘post-weaning multisystemic wasting syndrome’ (PMWS). It has therefore been determined that PMWS was not present in the herd.
The affected farm in South Australia, however, required an in-depth investigation. Initially, histopathological changes suggestive of PMWS were detected in samples submitted as part of an investigation into low level weaner mortality and ill-thrift. Further investigations involved an assessment of the particulars in this case against a case definition developed specifically for what would have been the first diagnosis of PMWS in Australia. Veterinary authorities carried out a detailed retrospective assessment of production and clinical data and laboratory findings, and a prospective study of pig health on the affected property and on properties related to the affected property by common ownership, common sources of pigs, and by trace-forward of pigs.
Based on the Australian case definition for PMWS, a first diagnosis of this disease would require that the case meet clinical, histopathological and virological criteria. Specifically, we would expect to see a herd syndrome of wasting in post-weaning pigs that is generally unresponsive to intervention, with characteristic histopathology and abundant porcine circovirus type 2 (PCV2) in lesions.
The current case met the histopathological and virological criteria but it did not meet the clinical criterion. While there was elevated morbidity and mortality in post-weaning pigs, there was no evidence of wasting in growing pigs and no evidence of disease spread between units or farms.
The disease situation was readily explained by infections with endemic disease agents in association with abnormal stress on young pigs and responded well to modified management and appropriate treatment with antibacterial agents. This rapid response to management changes is not characteristic of PMWS.
The investigation confirms that, although PCV2 is widespread in the Australian pig herd, Australia continues to be free from post-weaning multisystemic wasting syndrome.
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* *MISCELLANEOUS: AVIAN INFLUENZA IN KUWAIT (Detection of H5N1 antibodies in a flamingo)
Information received on 10 November 2005 from Dr Mohammed Wael Al-Muhanna, Acting Deputy Director General for Animal Health, The Public Authority for Agriculture Affairs and Fish Resources (PAAF), Safat:
Report date: 10 November 2005.
Precise identification of agent: avian influenza virus subtype H5N1.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 9 November 2005.
During routine surveillance for avian influenza, one out of two flamingos in a private property, close to the beach, was found to be positive for antibodies against avian influenza virus subtype H5N1.
Laboratory where diagnostic tests were performed Diagnostic tests used Date of submission of the samples Date of results Results Virology Laboratory, Department of Animal Health haemagglutination inhibition test using standard known haemagglutinating H5N1 antigen (from CVL Weybridge, United Kingdom) 2 Nov. 2005 9 Nov. 2005 1 out of 2 samples was positive for H5N1 antibodies standard antigen detection test for faecal samples from both flamingos … … negative Source of outbreak or origin of infection: may be due to migratory birds’ droppings.
Control measures: both birds were killed and incinerated immediately (stamping out) and the entire farm and the area were disinfected.
Other details/comments: serum and faecal samples collected from the neighbouring enclosures and the neighbouring farms were found to be negative for both antibodies and antigen detection.
Additional information received on 17 November 2005 from Dr Mohammed Wael Al-Muhanna, Acting Deputy Director General for Animal Health, The Public Authority for Agriculture Affairs and Fish Resources (PAAF), Safat:
Report date: 17 November 2005.
For routine surveillance for avian influenza (AI) in the bird population in Kuwait, the laboratory has used the following samples and procedures:
Samples:
- Serum samples from live birds.
- Cloacal swabs/faeces from live or dead birds.
Procedures:
- Serological test: haemagglutination inhibition test standard AI antigen (from CVL Weybridge, United Kingdom).
- Antigen detection: commercialized validated rapid AI virus antigen test kit; immunochromatographic test for the qualitative detection of AI virus antigen (all types) in avian faeces; rapid H5 AI virus antigen test kit; immunochromatographic test for the qualitative detection of H5 AI virus antigen in avian faeces.
Culture attempted on embryonated SPF(1) chicken eggs did not yield any AI isolates, hence no pathogenicity index test could be performed. It should also be noted that the serological tests (haemagglutination inhibition test), rapid antigen detection tests and isolation procedures in embryonated chicken SPF eggs have not revealed any positive results in any of the different kinds of birds tested from various areas in Kuwait since the last report.
(1) SPF: specific pathogen-free
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