[top]Disease Information
5 August 2005
Vol. 18 - No. 31Contents
WHITE SPOT DISEASE IN IRAN
(Date of previous outbreak of white spot disease in Iran reported to the OIE: 2003).
Immediate notification report
Information received on 2 August 2005 from Dr Mansour Sayari, Head of Iran Veterinary Organization, Ministry of Jihad-e-Agriculture, Tehran:
Report date: 2 August 2005.
Reason for immediate notification: first occurrence or re-occurrence in a country or zone/compartment of the country, if the country or zone/compartment of the country was previously considered to be free of that particular disease.
Affected species: Indian white prawn (Penaeus indicus).
Date of first confirmation of the event: 24 June 2005.
Date of start of the event: 23 June 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical diagnosis and advanced laboratory tests.
Details of occurrence:
First administrative division Lower administrative division Type of epidemio-logical unit Location Bushehr province, in the southern part of the country Haleh coastal area Persian Gulf coast
Species Morbidity rate Mortality rate Quantity (weight) of animals susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaughtered cru 70% 30% 477,120 kg 94,920 kg 51,368 kg 73,640 kg ... Description of affected population: prawns (shrimp) in semi-closed farming system.
Diagnosis: high mortality was observed in juvenile shrimp on 23 June 2005. Samples were sent to the provincial and national reference laboratories and were tested by the PCR(1) method.
Laboratories where diagnosis was made Species examined Number of animals examined Diagnostic tests used Date Results Bushehr Shrimp Central Laboratory Penaeus indicus 580 PCR 24 June 2005 positive Central Veterinary Laboratory of the Iran Veterinary Organization Penaeus indicus 22 PCR ... ... Source of outbreak or origin of infection: investigations underway.
Control measures undertaken:
- quarantine;
- tracing back;
- surveillance within containment and/or buffer zone;
- surveillance outside containment and/or buffer zone;
- official destruction of clinically diseased aquatic animals;
- official destruction of aquatic animal products;
- official disposal of carcasses, by-products and waste;
- decontamination of premises/disinfection;
- control of vectors;
- control of wildlife reservoirs;
- stamping out;
- zoning;
- within-country movement controls.
Treatment of affected animals: no.
Other details/comments:
- this is the first outbreak of white spot disease confirmed in the Haleh area;
- according to the national surveillance system, no other outbreak of white spot disease has been recorded in other shrimp farming sites, including Hormozgan and Chabahar.
(1) PCR: polymerase chain reaction
*
* *HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN KAZAKHSTAN
See also: 30 September 2005, 12 August 2005
Immediate notification report
Translation of information received on 2 August 2005 from Dr Marat Mynzhanov, Director, Veterinary Surveillance Department, Ministry of Agriculture, Astana:
Report date: 2 August 2005.
Precise identification of agent: influenza virus type A, subtype H5.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 29 July 2005.
Date of start of the event: 22 July 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical and laboratory.
Details of outbreak:
First administrative division Lower administrative division Type of epide-miolo-gical unit Name of the location Spe-cies Number of animals in the outbreak susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered Pavlodar region Irtysh farm Golubovka avi 2,800* ... 400 2,400 0 * 2,350 geese and 450 ducks
Diagnosis:
Laboratories where diagnosis was made Species examined Diagnostic tests used Date Results Pavlodar region branch of the Kazakhstan National Veterinary Laboratory avi
(geese)ELISA(1) (avian influenza virus antibody test kit) 27 July 2005 38/39 positive Scientific Research Institute for Agriculture avi
(geese)immunomembrane filter assay to detect influenza A or B antigens 1 Aug. 2005 detection of type A influenza antigen in 20% of suspensions from internal organs of dead birds inhibition haemagglutination test (indirect haemagglutination test) 1 Aug. 2005 detection of avian influenza virus type A with the antigenic formula H5 (preliminary diagnosis of avian influenza) Source of outbreak or origin of infection: contact with wild waterfowl at open water reservoirs.
Control measures undertaken:
- stamping out;
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- screening;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishment.
Control measures to be undertaken:
- control of wildlife reservoirs;
- zoning.
Vaccination prohibited: yes.
(1) ELISA: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
*
* *HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN INDONESIA
Follow-up report No. 10See also: 28 September 2006, 24 August 2006, 27 April 2006, 12 January 2006
Information received on 2 August 2005 from Prof. H.R. Wasito, Director General of Livestock Services, Ministry of Agriculture, Jakarta:
End of previous report period: 23 June 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [26], 180, dated 1 July 2005).
End of this report period: 1 August 2005.
Precise identification of agent : highly pathogenic influenza A virus, subtype H5N1.
News was received of a family cluster of three human patients with pneumonia who presented to healthcare facilities between 24 June and 7 July 2005. All three patients presented similar clinical signs and they all died.
The Directorate General of Livestock Services ordered an immediate investigation aimed at detecting any presence of avian influenza in animals. Purposive sampling was undertaken in the subdistrict where the affected family lived and in two neighbouring subdistricts (i.e. in the subdistricts of Legok, Panongan and Cisauk), in Tangerang district, Banten province, West Java. Investigations were conducted by the Research Institute for Veterinary Science, Bogor.
Summary of investigations carried out in Tangerang district:
Sampling Diagnostic testing Location Animals sampled Tests used Results Babat village, Legok subdistrict pigs (26 nasal swabs) PCR(1) negative ducks (15 cloacal swabs) PCR positive ducks (5 sera) antibody detection negative Ranca Iuh village, Panongan subdistrict pigs (10 nasal swabs) PCR positive ducks (10 cloacal swabs) PCR positive ducks/geese/chickens (30 sera) antibody detection 10/30 positive pigs restocked three months ago (16 nasal swabs) PCR negative In and around the victims' house birds (2 faecal samples) PCR 1/2 positive chickens (3 sera) serology negative Dandang village, Cisauk subdistrict (5 km from the victims' house) chickens (2 nasal swabs) PCR negative chicken (1 serum) haemagglutination inhibition test negative Control measures undertaken:
- partial stamping out; on 24 June 2005 stamping out was applied in Babat village, Legok subdistrict, to 32 pigs (20 adults and 12 piglets) and 192 muscovies/ducks;
- quarantine;
- movement control inside the country;
- disinfection of infected premises/establishments.
Other details/comments:
- There had not been any outbreaks of avian influenza with clinical signs in Tangerang district since April 2005 (see Follow-up report No. 8, Disease Information, 18 [21], 137, dated 27 May 2005).
- Samples taken from the human victims were sent by the Ministry of Human Health to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, United States of America (one of the four WHO(2) Reference Centres for influenza)(3).
(1) PCR: polymerase chain reaction
(2) WHO: World Health Organization
(3) Additional information on the human cases of avian influenza in Indonesia
*
* *VESICULAR STOMATITIS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Follow-up report No. 12See also: 28 December 2006, 7 December 2006, 23 November 2006, 16 November 2006, 2 November 2006, 26 October 2006, 19 October 2006, 12 October 2006, 5 October 2006, 28 September 2006, 21 September 2006, 14 September 2006, 7 September 2006, 31 August 2006, 24 August 2006, 13 April 2006, 16 February 2006, 26 January 2006, 12 January 2006, 23 December 2005, 9 December 2005, 18 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 28 October 2005, 21 October 2005, 14 October 2005, 7 October 2005, 30 September 2005, 23 September 2005, 16 September 2005, 2 September 2005, 26 August 2005, 19 August 2005, 29 July 2005, 15 July 2005, 8 July 2005
Information received on 3 August 2005 from Dr Peter Fernandez, Associate Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Washington, DC:
End of previous report period: 24 July 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [30], 215, dated 29 July 2005).
End of this report period: 31 July 2005.
Precise identification of agent: vesicular stomatitis virus type New Jersey.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 27 April 2005.
Date of start of the event: 16 April 2005.
New outbreaks:
First administrative division (State) Lower administrative division (County) Type of epide-miolo-gical unit Name of the location Date of start of the outbreak Spe-cies Number of animals in the outbreaks susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered Colorado Mesa f Junction 9 July 2005 equ 2 2 0 0 0 Colorado La Plata f Durango 12 July 2005 equ 2 1 0 0 0 Colorado La Plata f Bayfield 14 July 2005 equ 72 1 0 0 0 Colorado Mesa f Loma 16 July 2005 bov 10 3 0 0 0 Colorado Rio Blanco f Rangely 11 July 2005 equ 4 1 0 0 0 Colorado Mesa f Mesa 13 July 2005 bov 120 5 0 0 0 New Mexico Bernalillo f Albuquerque 16 July 2005 equ 1 1 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Jensen 11 July 2005 equ 32 3 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Vernal 15 July 2005 equ 10 4 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Vernal 15 July 2005 equ 29 3 0 0 0 Utah Salt Lake f Bluffdale 15 July 2005 equ 2 1 0 0 0 Utah Carbon f Price 17 July 2005 equ 8 1 0 0 0 bov 7 0 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Vernal 15 July 2005 equ 4 3 0 0 0 Utah Salt Lake f Bluffdale 15 July 2005 equ 4 1 0 0 0 Utah Beaver f Greenville 16 July 2005 equ 2 1 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Vernal 15 July 2005 equ 7 1 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Vernal 15 July 2005 equ 2 2 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Whiterocks 18 July 2005 bov 37 1 0 0 0 Utah Grand f Moab 15 July 2005 equ 2 1 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Vernal 17 July 2005 bov 61 2 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Vernal 17 July 2005 equ 5 2 0 0 0 bov 2 0 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Vernal 18 July 2005 equ 2 1 0 0 0 bov 10 1 0 0 0 Utah Grand f Moab 18 July 2005 equ 10 1 0 0 0 Utah Grand f Green River 18 July 2005 equ 3 0 0 0 0 bov 22 1 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Vernal 17 July 2005 equ 1 1 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Vernal 20 July 2005 equ 1 1 0 0 0 Utah Duchesne f Home 21 July 2005 equ 2 1 0 0 0 Utah Uintah f Neola 22 July 2005 equ 7 1 0 0 0 f = farm
Diagnosis:
Laboratories where diagnosis was made Species examined Diagnostic tests used Dates Results National Veterinary Services Laboratories, Ames, Iowa equ virus isolation 26 July 2005 positive complement fixation test 30 July 2005 Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory, Plum Island, New York bov virus isolation 27 July 2005 complement fixation test 30 July 2005 Source of outbreaks or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive (vectors?).
Control measures undertaken:
- control of arthropods;
- quarantine;
- on-going surveillance activities are being performed by APHIS Veterinary Services and Arizona(1), Colorado, New Mexico, Texas(1) and Utah State Departments of Agriculture personnel.
Treatment of affected animals: no.
Vaccination prohibited: yes.
(1) Note: no new vesicular stomatitis-positive premises have been reported in Texas since May 2005 and in Arizona since June 2005.
*
* *EQUINE RHINOPNEUMONITIS IN ISRAEL
See also: 14 October 2005
(Disease never reported before in Israel).
Immediate notification report
Information received on 3 August 2005 from Dr Moshe Chaimovitz, Director of Veterinary and Animal Health Services, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Beit-Dagan:
Report date: 31 July 2005.
Reason for immediate notification: first occurrence of a listed disease in a country.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 21 July 2005.
Date of start of the event: 27 June 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical and laboratory.
Details of outbreak:
First administrative division Lower administrative division Type of epide-miolo-gical unit Name of the location Spe-cies Number of animals in the outbreak susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered HaDarom (Southern) region Ashqelon district farm Be'er Toviyya equ 20 4 0 0 0 Description of affected population: horses in a riding and breeding stable. Horses are kept in the premises and are not mixed with other horses. In some cases horses are moved to exhibitions and for breeding and training reasons.
Diagnosis:
Laboratories where diagnosis was made Diagnostic tests used Dates Results Kimron Veterinary Institute, Beit-Dagan virus neutralisation test based on seroconversion 27 June and 21 July 2005 positive Source of outbreak or origin of infection: under investigation.
Control measures undertaken:
- quarantine;
- clinical and serological screening of all stables within a radius of 3 km is being conducted.
Vaccination prohibited: yes.
*
* *NEWCASTLE DISEASE IN BOTSWANA
Follow-up report No. 1See also: 26 August 2005, 22 July 2005
Information received on 4 August 2005 from Dr Musa Fanikiso, Director of Animal Health and Production, Ministry of Agriculture, Gaborone:
End of previous report period: 20 July 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [29], 209, dated 22 July 2005).
End of this report period: 4 August 2005.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 15 July 2005.
Date of start of the event: 7 July 2005.
After the report of a Newcastle disease (ND) outbreak in Woodhall 2, Lobatse district (see Immediate notification report), an outbreak occurred in Mochudi district (about 70 km away). There is, however, no evidence to suggest direct spread from the outbreak in Lobatse.
Details of new outbreak:
First administrative division Lower administrative division Type of epide-miolo-gical unit Name of the location Spe-cies Number of animals in the outbreak susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered South Eastern region Mochudi district village Boseja ward of Mochudi village avi 550 382 358 20 0 Description of affected population: backyard chickens of all ages and both sexes.
Diagnosis of the new outbreak: the disease was initially suspected following clinical signs of dullness, greenish diarrhoea followed by death (100% mortality) in 11 of 17 homesteads/households rearing backyard chickens in Boseja ward.
Laboratory where diagnosis was made Diagnostic tests used Date Results National Veterinary Laboratory, Gaborone haemagglutination test 1 Aug. 2005 titres: 1:64 haemagglutination inhibition test 1 Aug. 2005 titres: 1:128 Source of outbreak or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive.
Control measures
A. Lobatse outbreak:
- Movement restrictions into and out of Woodhall 2 (affected area) are still in place.
- Supervision of cleaning and disinfection of infected premises was undertaken.
- Vaccination: 28,000 doses of ND vaccine have been sold to date; 200 chickens in seven households closest to the outbreak were vaccinated immediately, under official veterinary supervision, using lyophilized (freeze-dried) live vaccine.
- Public awareness campaigns through the media and direct extension are continuing.
- Screening: ND surveillance is also being undertaken in the only ostrich farm in the controlled area; so far, 55 sera have been collected from ostriches for this purpose. There has been no evidence of the disease in this species.
B. Mochudi outbreak:
- Movement restrictions into and out of Mochudi village have been imposed until further notice.
- Disinfection of infected premises.
- Prophylactic vaccination of poultry was advised and farmers are administering it with the assistance of extension staff. About 100,000 doses of ND vaccine have been sold by the Departmental vaccine outlet points (Livestock Advisory Centre) in Mochudi. More vaccine is being procured to arrest the spread.
- A total of 619 chickens were vaccinated immediately under official veterinary supervision.
- Intense public awareness efforts are being undertaken to inform farmers and the public about the disease and the current control measures.
- Investigations to determine the extent of the outbreak are continuing.
Other details/comments:
- Backyard chickens are not vaccinated against ND by their owners as routinely as commercial birds and, as a result, backyard chickens are usually the only ones affected by outbreaks.
- The national ostrich flock is free from ND. The country has a biannual ND (and avian influenza) surveillance campaign in ostriches.
- ND vaccination is prohibited for ostriches.
*
* *INFECTIOUS HAEMATOPOIETIC NECROSIS IN SPAIN
Virus detection in a farm(Infection never reported before in Spain).
Immediate notification report
Translation of information received on 4 August 2005 from Dr Arnaldo Cabello Navarro, Deputy Director General of Animal Health, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Madrid
Report date: 4 August 2005.
Reason for immediate notification: first occurrence in a country, if the country was previously considered to be free of that particular disease.
Affected species: rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss).
Date of first confirmation of the event: 27 July 2005.
Clinical disease: no. There have been no clinical signs or deaths associated with the event.
Nature of diagnosis: advanced laboratory tests.
Details of occurrence:
First administrative division Lower administrative division Type of epidemiological unit Location Andalusia Autonomous Community Granada province, Loja district farm Riofrio farm, located on Rio Frio river, in the Genil River basin Description of affected population: the farm contains 9,000 rainbow trout in freshwater in a semi-closed farming system. There are also sturgeons in ponds on the same farm.
Diagnosis:
Laboratories where diagnosis was made Species examined Number of animals examined Diagnostic tests used Date Results Central Veterinary Laboratory O. mykiss 150 (in 15 pools of 10 fish each) viral isolation on cell culture 27 July 2005 1 pool positive PCR(1) 27 July 2005 the pool in which the virus was isolated and two other pools were positive Additional samples were taken (test results are pending).
Source of outbreak or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive.
Control measures undertaken:
- quarantine;
- tracing forward;
- tracing back;
- surveillance within containment and/or buffer zone;
- surveillance outside containment and/or buffer zone;
- zoning;
- within-country movement controls.
Treatment of affected animals: no.
Vaccination prohibited: yes.
Other details/comments: the preliminary epidemiological investigations did not reveal any fish movements from this farm to other fish farms.
(1) PCR: polymerase chain reaction
*
* *HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN RUSSIA
Follow-up report No. 1See also: 30 December 2005, 21 October 2005, 14 October 2005, 26 August 2005, 12 August 2005, 29 July 2005
Information received on 5 August 2005 from Dr Evgueny A. Nepoklonov, Head of the Main Veterinary Department, Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Moscow:
End of previous report period: 24 July 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [30], 218, dated 29 July 2005).
End of this report period: 5 August 2005.
Precise identification of agent: influenza virus type A, subtype H5N1. An isolate from the village of Suzdalka has been subjected to an in-depth examination. The preliminary results of sequencing show that the isolate can be considered highly pathogenic.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 23 July 2005.
Date of start of the event: 18 July 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.
Details of outbreaks:
First administrative division (region) Lower administrative division (district) Type of epide-miolo-gical unit Name of the location Date of start of the outbreak Spe-cies Number of animals in the outbreaks susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered Novosibirsk (Novosibirskaya oblast) Kupino village ... 18 July 2005 avi ... ... ... ... ... Dovolnoye village ... 22 July 2005 avi ... ... ... ... ... Chistoozernoye village ... 22 July 2005 avi ... ... ... ... ... Description of affected populations: chickens, turkeys, ducks and geese in backyard holdings.
The disease has been reported in a total of 13 villages:
In 5 villages, birds have shown clinical signs of the disease and deaths have been reported; birds have tested positive to antibodies to H5 and the virus has been isolated.
In 4 villages, no deaths have been reported, but birds have tested positive for antibodies to H5 and the virus has been isolated.
In the remaining 4 villages, no deaths have been reported, nor has the virus been detected in any of the birds. However, birds have tested positive to antibodies to H5.
Diagnosis:
Laboratories where diagnosis was made Number of animals examined Diagnostic tests used Dates Results Federal Centre for Animal Health (ARRIAH) 70 ELISA(1) for antigen detection 23 July - 5 Aug. 2005 positive All-Russia State Research Institute for Control, Standardisation and Certification of Veterinary Preparations 5 PCR(2) (M-protein gene) 23 July - 5 Aug. 2005 positive Association for Scientific Production ‘NPO Vektor’ 62 haemagglutination test 23 July - 5 Aug. 2005 positive Novosibirsk inter-regional veterinary laboratory, Federal Governmental University 5,324 ELISA(1) for antibody detection 28 July 2005 positive Source of outbreaks or origin of infection: the epidemiological analysis has shown that the disease started in poultry in contact with wild waterfowl at open water reservoirs. Waterfowl are considered the primary source of the virus. In addition, there are reports of the disease in wild birds. Infection of domestic birds in all the affected localities, some of which are up to 600 km apart, occurred simultaneously. In all cases, the source of infection was wild waterfowl in lakes frequented by domestic birds.
Control measures undertaken:
- Stamping out: stamping out of birds suspected of being infected has begun. In all three affected districts a total of 18,513 domestic birds of five species have been destroyed.
- Quarantine.
- Movement control inside the country.
- Screening: all localities in Novosibirsk region are being screened for circulation of the virus and presence of seropositive birds.
- Zoning.
- Disinfection of infected premises/establishments.
Vaccination prohibited: yes.
Other details/comments:
- No signs of the disease have appeared in commercial poultry farms in the region. Monitoring of all 14 commercial poultry farms did not reveal any circulation of the virus or seropositive birds.
- In localities where the infection has resulted in deaths of birds, mortality since the beginning of the epizootic has not exceeded 3.3%.
- The application of control measures has sharply reduced mortality. There are no longer any deaths accompanied by characteristic clinical signs among domestic birds, and total daily mortality in the different localities is only some thousandths of the total flock.
(1) ELISA: enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
(2) PCR: polymerase chain reaction
*
* *NEWCASTLE DISEASE IN FRANCE
Update on the situation as of 3 August 2005See also: 9 November 2006, 12 October 2006, 23 December 2005, 9 December 2005, 25 November 2005, 18 November 2005, 11 November 2005, 4 November 2005, 28 October 2005, 26 August 2005, 29 July 2005, 22 July 2005
Information received on 5 August 2005 from Dr Monique Eloit, Deputy Director General, General Directorate for Food (DGAL), Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Fisheries and Rural Affairs, Paris:
End of previous report period: 27 July 2005 (see Disease Information, 18 [30], 223, dated 29 July 2005).
End of this report period: 3 August 2005.
1. Initial detection of disease
On 15 July 2005, the French authorities were informed by the British authorities of a confirmed outbreak of Newcastle disease (ND) on a pheasant farm in Surrey, England. The French authorities immediately launched an epidemiological investigation to determine whether French farms could be at risk.
The results of this investigation revealed that five farms located in two French départements - one in Loire-Atlantique and four in Vendée - had supplied the affected English farm with pheasants in three consignments between 21 June and 5 July 2005. The five farms were immediately blocked and placed under surveillance.
Also on 15 July 2005, veterinary inspections as well as serological and virological sampling were conducted on these farms.
These veterinary inspections did not reveal any clinical signs at the Vendée farms or in the area surrounding the Loire-Atlantique farm. However, some mild and nonspecific clinical signs were observed in a small number of animals at the suspect farm, where only pheasants and partridges are bred.
Alongside these tests, the relevant national laboratory (AFSSA(1) Ploufragan) carried out molecular sequencing of fragments of genetic material, which revealed that the protein sequence for fusion site F and surrounding the cleavage site is RRQRRF, indicating a virulent strain of avian paramyxovirus 1. These laboratory results led the French authorities to notify the European Commission and the OIE of an ND outbreak at the Loire-Atlantique farm. The sequence identified is very similar to viruses of the phylogenic line of the 5b group.
Meanwhile, the European Union Reference Laboratory for ND (Weybridge, United Kingdom) identified the strain isolated at the English farm on 15 July as NDV/turkey/Finland/2004.
Finally, on 29 July, an analysis of 218 nucleotides by the same laboratory revealed that the molecular sequence detected in the Loire-Atlantique outbreak is identical to the virus isolated in the United Kingdom.
2. Chronology
Date Series of events and analyses 20 June 3,500 young pheasants from two farms in the Vendée département were sent to Surrey, in the south of England. 22 June 2,500 young pheasants from a farm in the Loire-Atlantique département were sent to Surrey. 4 July 2,700 young pheasants from two farms in the Vendée département were sent to Surrey. 15 July British authorities issued information on the suspected ND occurrence in the United Kingdom and its epidemiological link to France. 15 July The five implicated Vendée and Loire-Atlantique farms were blocked and placed under surveillance. 15 July In the farms involved, veterinary inspections and sampling for serological and virological testing. 18 July (evening) Positive serological results for the Loire-Atlantique farm (negative for the other farms). 19 July Notification to the OIE: suspicion of ND. Situation presented to the European Commission and Member States of the European Union. No special Community safeguard measure was deemed necessary. 20 and 21 July Preventive culling of 55,000 animals on the Loire-Atlantique farm. 21 July First intermediate result of the virological analysis was negative for the Loire-Atlantique farm. 22 July First virological results were negative for the Vendée farms. 26 July (evening) Molecular sequencing: identification of a virulent sequence (APMV1). 27 July Notification to the OIE and the European Commission of an ND outbreak. 29 July An analysis of 218 nucleotides revealed that the molecular sequence of the virus responsible for the Loire-Atlantique outbreak is identical to the virus isolated in the United Kingdom. 1 August The final result of the virological analysis for the Loire-Atlantique farm was negative after three successive passages in tissue culture. 1 August Final virological results were negative for the four Vendée farms. 3. Measures taken in France
3.1. The five farms involved were blocked and placed under surveillance as from 15 July. For the four Vendée farms, this restriction was lifted on 26 July following negative serological and virological results and in the absence of clinical signs. The restriction remains in effect at the Loire-Atlantique farm.
3.2. Following positive serological results and as a preventive measure, the Loire-Atlantique farm’s 55,000 animals, located on two sites, were culled on 20 and 21 July. Disinfection was carried out from 22 to 25 July.
3.3. All farms belonging to the same poultry cooperative company were placed under official control, along with the 19 farms located within a 3-km radius of the affected farm (the protection zone) and the 59 farms within a 10-km radius (the surveillance zone). In the protection zone, poultry farms are blocked and must undergo veterinary inspections and serological tests. In the surveillance zone, only restriction of animal movement is applied. These measures had largely been implemented as a precautionary step since 15 July.
4. Control of intra-Community trade and exports
As concerns the movements of poultry products defined by Article 2.7.13.4. of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code, even before the French outbreak in the Loire-Atlantique département was confirmed and in accordance with the European Commission, France opted as soon as the suspicion was raised and as a precautionary measure to suspend certification for the export of poultry products from all regions of France and all intra-Community trade in live birds and hatching eggs from the Loire-Atlantique département. Beginning on 21 July, exports from all areas with the exception of the Loire-Atlantique département to third countries were reauthorized, depending on country-specific requirements.
4.1. Intra-Community trade: As of 4 August, with the exception of pheasants, partridges, and quails (live animals and hatching eggs) from the Loire-Atlantique département which, as a precautionary measure, are still subject to the measures applied on 21 July 2005, intra-Community trade is no longer restricted unless it originates within a 10-kilometer radius of the infected Loire-Atlantique farm, where it is still suspended in accordance with the regulations. This decision was reached in agreement with the European Commission.
4.2. Exports to third countries: With the exception of pheasants, partridges, and quails from the Loire-Atlantique département, which are still subject to the measures applied on 21 July 2005, and in response to favourable developments, certification for the export of French poultry products to third countries may resume as usual, beginning on 4 August, depending on the requirements of the destination countries. This decision was reached in agreement with the European Commission. Only the export of poultry products from within a 10-km radius of the infected Loire-Atlantique farm to all countries remains prohibited.
5. Epidemiological investigation
5.1. Possible sources of infection
The precise source of the disease is unknown at this stage but the link with avifauna cannot be ruled out given the suspect farm’s close proximity to a lake known for its migratory bird population. This is the most likely hypothesis, but all potentially infectious epidemiological contacts must be considered, in particular the movement of humans, equipment, and vehicles.
Moreover, an analysis of 218 nucleotides revealed that the molecular sequence detected in the Loire-Atlantique outbreak is identical to the virus isolated in the United Kingdom.
The epidemiological investigation is nevertheless ongoing.
5.2. Potential risks of spreading
The Loire-Atlantique farm is located in an area where mainly game is bred; there is no nearby large-scale domestic poultry farm, hatchery, or breeder. This farm comprises two sites. On 15 June, 380 pheasants were transferred from the main site to the secondary site. Serological tests carried out during the culling of the animals on 20 and 21 July clearly determined that the birds transferred on 15 June were serologically negative. None of the animals at the secondary site showed any clinical signs up until their preventive culling. This unmistakably demonstrates that viral circulation could not have taken place before 15 June 2005. Given this information, the risk period was between 15 June and 15 July.
No animal has left the affected farm for any location in France, the European Union or any other country since 1 June, with the exception of the 22 June shipment to the United Kingdom, which implies a safety margin since the risk period falls between 15 June and 15 July.
In addition, all farms under surveillance have been blocked. No poultry products may leave them as long as surveillance measures remain in place.
The 3-km protection zone contains 19 farms, which are currently undergoing veterinary inspections and serological sampling. The 10-km surveillance zone contains 59 farms. No clinical signs of ND have been detected. To date, several positive serological analysis results have been obtained at two farms located in the restricted perimeter surrounding the infected farm; no clinical signs were found. The corresponding virological analyses are now underway, and the first intermediate results have been negative.
Because breeders and veterinarians are particularly vigilant at the moment, seven clinical suspicions of ND with no relation to the Loire-Atlantique farm were declared to the official veterinary authorities. The results of the serological and virological analyses carried out thus far have been favourable.
5.3. Summary of the situation
Although the ND outbreak in France was confirmed on 27 July, all protective and control measures had been pre-emptively put in place as of 15 July. Moreover, an epidemiological investigation determined that no potentially infected poultry product was exported or traded, even considering an extended security period starting 1 June, as the potential risk period falls between 15 June and 15 July.
As of 4 August, limits on movements only apply to the area within the restricted perimeter surrounding the infected farm, where the animals were culled on 20 and 21 July, and to game bird farms in the Loire-Atlantique département.
(1) AFSSA: Agence française de sécurité sanitaire des aliments (French Agency for Food Safety)
*
* *STREPTOCOCCUS SUIS IN CHINA (PEOPLE'S REP. OF ~)
See also: 9 September 2005
Immediate notification report
Information received on 5 August 2005 from Mr Jia Youling, Director General, Veterinary Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture, Beijing:
Report date: 5 August 2005.
Reason for immediate notification: an emerging disease with significant morbidity or mortality, or zoonotic potential (though this is not a disease notifiable to the OIE).
Precise identification of agent: Streptococcus suis B.
Date of first confirmation of the event: 25 July 2005.
Date of start of the event: 25 June 2005.
Nature of diagnosis: clinical, post-mortem and laboratory.
Details of outbreaks:
First administrative division (province) Lower administrative division (region) Type of epide-miolo-gical unit Date of start of the outbreak Spe-cies Number of animals in the outbreaks susceptible cases deaths destroyed slaugh-tered Sichuan Chengdu ... 2 Aug. 2005 sui 19 15 1 18 0 Sichuan Deyang ... 29 July 2005 sui 66 5 5 61 0 Sichuan Luzhou ... 12 July 2005 sui 7 2 2 5 0 Sichuan Mianyang ... 24 July 2005 sui 1 1 1 0 0 Sichuan Nanchong ... 29 July 2005 sui 2 2 2 0 0 Sichuan Neijiang ... 15 July 2005 sui 3,159 193 0 3,159 0 Sichuan Zigong ... 17 July 2005 sui 583 9 7 576 0 Sichuan Ziyang ... 25 June 2005 sui 2,899 414 301 2,598 0 Description of affected population: all infected pigs are in backyard farms.
Diagnosis:
Laboratories where diagnosis was made Diagnostic tests used Date Results Sichuan Province General Station of Animal Epidemics Prevention and Surveillance, Sichuan isolation and culture of bacterium ... positive Foreign Animal Disease Diagnosis Centre, National Animal Quarantine Institute, Qingdao microscopy ... positive fluorescent antibody test ... positive Harbin Veterinary Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Harbin PCR(1) 25 July 2005 positive sequencing ... the pathogen, Streptococcus suis B, shares 98% nucleotide homology with the CPS2 gene of AF118389 strain of the GenBank databank Note : The Foreign Animal Disease Diagnosis Centre and the Harbin Veterinary Research Institute carried out a differential diagnosis. Using RT-PCR(2) with type A influenza virus as positive control and RT-PCR(2) for Nipah virus, the results were negative. The results of pathogen isolation by SPF egg inoculation and pathogen isolation on VERO cell line, after two passages, were also negative. Avian influenza and Nipah disease were, therefore, excluded.
Source of outbreaks or origin of infection: unknown or inconclusive.
Control measures
A. Undertaken:
- Stamping out.
- Quarantine (lifting of quarantine: 14 days after the last pig was culled).
- Movement control inside the country.
- Screening.
- Zoning. Premises with infected pigs or relevant slaughterhouses and other facilities are considered as infected points; areas within a 1-km radius are considered as infected zones; areas within 3 km around the infected zones are considered as buffer zones.
- Disinfection of infected premises/establishments.
- Dipping/spraying.
- Sichuan province has organised a general survey for 51,880,300 live pigs (87.92% of the pig population in the province).
B. To be undertaken: vaccination. An inactivated Streptococcus suis vaccine is being tested in the field. All pigs in the infected zones and buffer zones will be vaccinated if the experiment is successful.
Treatment of affected animals: no.
(1) PCR: polymerase chain reaction
(2) RT-PCR: reverse transcriptase - polymerase chain reaction
*
* *
http://www.oie.int/
Copyright
© 2004 OIE
World Animal Health Organisation