



**REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE *AD HOC* GROUP
ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY RISK STATUS EVALUATION OF MEMBERS¹
Paris, 29 – 30 October 2018**

A meeting of the *ad hoc* Group on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk Status Evaluation of Members (hereafter the Group) was held at the OIE Headquarters from 29 to 30 October 2018.

1. Opening

On behalf of Dr Monique Eloit, Director General of the OIE, Dr Neo Mapitse, Head of the Status Department, welcomed and thanked the Group for its commitment and the extensive support towards the OIE mandates. He acknowledged the amount of work before, during and after the *ad hoc* Group meeting and the efforts required in reviewing the dossiers and highlighted that the official recognition of disease status was an important activity for the OIE.

Dr Mapitse updated the Group on the progress of the 6th Strategic Plan of the OIE and referred to the advancement with regard to strengthening the procedures for the selection of members of the Specialist Commissions and *ad hoc* Groups.

Dr Mapitse reminded the Group on the significance and confidentiality of the dossiers received for official recognition and thanked the experts for having signed the updated forms for undertaking of confidentiality. He underlined the OIE procedures for protecting the confidentiality of information and for declaring potential conflicts of interest (by withdrawing themselves from the discussion/conclusion in case of a potential conflict of interest). No conflicts of interest were declared in this Group.

Dr Mapitse pointed out that whilst the evaluation of the BSE risk status of Members might be a politically sensitive issue, the Group's assessment should be driven by standards, science and evidence-based, and highlighted that the ongoing revision of the BSE Chapter should not impact the evaluation of the dossiers received by the Group. Dr Mapitse also encouraged the Group to capture the rationale supporting its decisions and recommendations in its meeting report for the consideration of Members.

The Group and the OIE welcomed Drs Lesley van Helden and Sara Perucho as new members in the Group.

2. Adoption of the agenda and appointment of chairperson and rapporteur

Dr Ximena Melón was appointed Chair and Dr Lesley van Helden acted as rapporteur with the support of the OIE Secretariat. The Group endorsed the proposed agenda.

¹ Note: This *ad hoc* Group report reflects the views of its members and may not necessarily reflect the views of the OIE. This report should be read in conjunction with the February 2019 report of the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases because this report provides its considerations and comments. It is available at: <http://www.oie.int/en/international-standard-setting/specialists-commissions-groups/scientific-commission-reports/meetings-reports/>

The terms of reference, agenda and list of participants are provided as [Appendices I, II and III](#) respectively.

3. Evaluation of applications from Members for the official recognition of their negligible BSE risk status

3.1. Serbia

In August 2018, Serbia submitted a dossier seeking recognition as a country presenting a negligible BSE risk status.

The Group requested additional information and received clarification from Serbia. Points specifically discussed by the Group are summarised below:

a) Section 1: Risk Assessment — Article 11.4.2. point 1

- Risk assessment for entry of the BSE agent

The Group took note that from 2009 to 2018 importations of meat-and-bone meal (MBM) or greaves containing ruminant proteins into Serbia were prohibited unless intended for the manufacturing of pet food. In addition, imports of MBM were permitted only for those facilities approved by the Veterinary Service for pet food production, provided that imports were certified as not containing specified risk material (SRM) and mechanically separated meat. The Group noted that within the past eight years, only prepared pet food in original package was imported from undetermined BSE risk status countries.

The Group noted that live cattle were imported into Serbia from countries with a negligible or controlled BSE risk status as well as from countries with an undetermined BSE risk status within the past 7 years. The Group examined the sanitary requirements applicable to these importations and concluded that they were consistent with the requirements of Article 11.4.9. of the *Terrestrial Code*.

With respect to imports of products of bovine origin, the Group noted that various meat and meat products of bovine origin were imported from countries having a negligible, controlled or undetermined risk status for BSE. While most of the import requirements were compliant with the recommendations of Articles 11.4.10-11.4.12 of the *Terrestrial Code*, the Group noted that imports of “carcasses, half carcasses or half carcasses cut into no more than three wholesale cuts, and quarters containing no specified risk material (SRM) other than the vertebral column, including dorsal root ganglia” labelled as such were allowed from countries with a controlled or undetermined BSE risk status. Upon subsequent questioning, Serbia clarified that the aforementioned products were imported only for further processing and SRM were removed in the cutting plants.

Overall, the Group considered that the conclusion of the entry assessment was that the risk that the BSE agent could have entered Serbia during the interval covered by the assessment, although low, could not be considered negligible.

- Risk of recycling and amplification of the BSE agent

The Group noted that legislation defining a list of tissues and organs as SRM was introduced in 2006 and, while it had been modified to some extent over the years, it included all those materials listed in Article 11.4.14. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Group noted that SRM, which are included in the definition of Category 1 material, were required to be removed in abattoirs, cutting facilities or authorised butcher shops, marked immediately upon removal and disposed of as Category 1 material, i.e., incinerated or processed by Category 1 rendering plants and subsequently incinerated or buried. Dead bovine animals and materials declared unfit for human consumption were also classified as Category 1 material and disposed of as such.

The Group noted that imported cattle, products derived from them and associated waste were treated in the same manner as if they were derived from domestic cattle.

The Group acknowledged that since 2006, SRM as well as non-SRM ruminant waste materials, which were rendered, had been processed under high temperature and pressure (133°C, for at least 20 minutes with a minimum absolute pressure of 3 bars). This is in compliance with the procedures for the reduction of BSE infectivity in MBM as outlined in Article 11.4.19. of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Group noted that since 2013, all MBM classified as Category 1 has been incinerated. However, the Group also noted that two rendering plants processing Category 1 material changed to another rendering method in 2014 and 2016 respectively. While this method would be unlikely to substantially reduce BSE infectivity, the Group acknowledged that the subsequent incineration of the resulting MBM would lead to the destruction of the BSE agent.

While only authorised feed production facilities were permitted to use ruminant MBM for the production of feed for swine and poultry from 2006 to 2011, the Group acknowledged that none of them produced feed for ruminants. Following the implementation of a total feed ban in April 2011 under which all terrestrial processed animal proteins (PAP) are prohibited from use in feed for food animals, only fish meal has been used in feed for poultry and pigs. In addition, from the information provided in the dossier as well as the responses by Serbia to additional questions, the Group acknowledged that following the introduction of the total feed ban only facilities producing fish feed were approved to use non-ruminant MBM and only pet food production plants, operating in dedicated and separate establishments, were allowed to process Category 3 ruminant material. The definition of Category 3 ruminant material in Serbia is consistent with that of the European Union. It consists of parts of slaughtered animals which are fit for human consumption but not used for human consumption for commercial reasons. The Group acknowledged that Serbia provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that appropriate controls were in place to prevent cross-contamination of MBM in any livestock feed.

Overall, regarding the exposure assessment, the Group concluded that the risk of recycling and amplification of the BSE agent if it was present in Serbia's cattle population during the interval covered by the assessment had been negligible.

- Appropriate level of control and audit of the feed ban

The Group acknowledged that a ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban was introduced in Serbia in 2001 and extended to a mammalian-to-ruminant ban in 2005; followed by a total feed ban in April of 2011 whereby all processed animal protein of terrestrial animals was prohibited from being used in animal feed.

The Group noted that rendering facilities have been inspected multiple times each year and that feed mills were audited at least once a year according to the Veterinary Service's National Annual Inspection Plan. Moreover, since 2006, feeds were tested for the presence of MBM using microscopy. Considering that a total feed ban was in place since 2011, the Group agreed that microscopy would be sufficient to detect cross-contamination in ruminant feed. Since 2016, RT-PCR was used as an additional method for testing aquatic animal feed, where the inclusion of pig and poultry PAP was allowed, to screen for contamination with material of ruminant origin.

The Group reviewed the information provided on testing of feed for ruminants from 2010 to 2018 and acknowledged that all feed samples had tested negative for the presence of MBM. The Group noted that in case of non-compliance, corrective actions would include suspension of production or shipment, destruction of feed or diverting it for use for another purpose.

Overall the Group concluded that the appropriate legislation, control and audit of the proper implementation of the feed ban had been in force for at least eight years.

b) Surveillance according to Articles 11.4.20. - 11.4.22.

The Group noted that the surveillance undertaken over the seven-year period from 2012 to 2018 exceeded the minimum requirements of type B surveillance according to Article 11.4.22. on surveillance for BSE in the *Terrestrial Code*. Based on the information provided in the dossier, 49,127.92 surveillance points were collected, compared to a minimal requirement of 47,700 for an adult cattle population of 488,629 over two years of age.

The Group noted that Serbia's surveillance programme for BSE targeted all surveillance subpopulations and that samples reflected the cattle distribution in the country. While the Group acknowledged that Serbia did not claim an excess number of clinical cases, it was noted that some of the clinical signs reported in the dossier were not specific enough to raise legitimate concerns that an animal could be reasonably categorised as a clinical suspect according to Article 11.4.21. point 1 of the *Terrestrial Code*. In addition, the clinical signs were not specified for about 25% of the suspect cases reported. The Group recommended that more awareness campaigns should be conducted among all relevant stakeholders on the clinical signs of BSE to improve the specificity of passive surveillance.

c) Other requirements — Article 11.4.2. points 2–4

▪ Awareness programme

The Group noted that an awareness programme on BSE was initiated in 1991 throughout the country, involving lectures, workshops and training courses, followed by the establishment of a group of BSE experts in 1997, to provide guidance to staff within the Veterinary Service and relevant stakeholders. The Group appreciated that a variety of communication tools, including film, manuals and flyers, were used to raise awareness among target audiences, such as staff of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management, the Veterinary Directorate, diagnostic laboratories, official veterinarians, veterinary practitioners, veterinary students, slaughterhouse personnel as well as animal breeders, keepers and handlers, feed producers and importers. The Group concluded that this awareness programme met the requirements of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Group recommended that Serbia maintains the awareness activities and enhance their geographical distribution.

▪ Compulsory notification and investigation

The Group noted that BSE was declared to be a notifiable disease under relevant legislation in 1991 and that a directive was in place outlining the procedures to be followed by animal keepers in case of suspicion of an infectious disease. The Group acknowledged that financial compensation would be provided for fallen stock if they tested positive for BSE, any animals killed due to a suspicion of BSE as well as the costs of transport and testing of samples from BSE suspect cases. Sanctions were envisaged for failure to report BSE cases. The Group therefore concluded that the system for compulsory notification and investigation met the requirements of the *Terrestrial Code*.

▪ Laboratory examination

The Group noted that diagnostic testing for BSE was conducted in two laboratories accredited for TSE testing, namely the National Reference laboratory and, since 2007, the Scientific Institute of Veterinary Medicine of Serbia.

According to the additional information provided by Serbia, since 2005, clinical suspects as well as inconclusive or positive results from screening of healthy populations, fallen stock and casualty slaughter were subjected to confirmatory testing using at least one of Western immunoblot, histopathology or immunohistochemistry or a combination of these tests. Clinical

suspects could also be tested using a combination of rapid tests. The Group pointed out that according to Chapter 2.4.5. of the *Terrestrial Manual*, histopathology alone is not appropriate to define a sample as negative for BSE for any of the surveillance streams, either as a primary or as a secondary test. The Group recommended that Serbia undertake all laboratory tests for BSE using methods recommended by the *Terrestrial Manual*: i.e., immunohistochemistry, Western immunoblot or rapid tests as primary test, and immunohistochemistry or Western immunoblot as secondary test to confirm positive or inconclusive primary test results.

The Group also took note that in case of a positive result, samples would be sent to an OIE Reference Laboratory for BSE for confirmatory testing.

Overall the Group concluded that the laboratory examination for BSE carried out in Serbia could be considered to be compliant with the *Terrestrial Manual* for at least the preceding seven years.

d) *BSE history in the country*

The Group acknowledged that BSE had never been reported in Serbia.

e) *Compliance with the questionnaire in Article 1.6.5.*

The Group appreciated the well-structured and comprehensive dossier provided by Serbia and agreed that the dossier as submitted was compliant with the format of the questionnaire in Article 1.6.5. of the *Terrestrial Code*. However, the Group pointed out that the extensive number of appendices together with the citation of numerous legislative acts and regulations in the core dossier without an appropriate summary led to significant challenges in undertaking an evaluation of this application.

f) *Conclusions*

- Recommended status

Considering the information submitted in the dossier and Serbia's answers to follow-up questions raised, the Group concluded that the application was compliant with both the requirements of Article 11.4.3. and the BSE questionnaire of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Group therefore recommended that Serbia be recognised as a country with a 'negligible BSE risk status'.

4. Evaluation of applications from Members for the official recognition of their controlled BSE risk status

4.1. Ecuador

In August 2018, Ecuador submitted a dossier seeking recognition as a country presenting a controlled BSE risk status.

The Group requested additional information and received clarification from the Member. Points specifically discussed by the Group are summarised below:

a) *Section 1: Risk Assessment — Article 11.4.2. point 1*

- Risk assessment for entry of the BSE agent

With regard to the information on imports of MBM, greaves, or feedstuffs containing either, live cattle and products of ruminant origin, the Group appreciated the clarity and completeness of the information provided by Ecuador.

With regard to importations of feedstuff containing MBM, greaves and/or tallow during the past 8 years, the Group noted that only pet food that was pre-packed, retail ready, and labelled as not to be fed to ruminants, was imported into Ecuador from a single country with a negligible BSE risk status. Moreover, poultry meal and viscera, pork meal and poultry, pig and ruminant tallow were only imported from countries with either a negligible or a controlled BSE risk status.

The Group noted that imports of live cattle into Ecuador within the past 7 years were exclusively for reproductive purposes from four countries, all with a negligible BSE risk status. Furthermore, all imported live cattle were individually identified and their movements and final disposition were known. The Group examined the sanitary requirements applicable to these importations and concluded that they were compliant with the requirements of Article 11.4.6. of the *Terrestrial Code*.

With regard to imports of products of ruminant origin within the past 7 years, the great majority of the products were imported from countries with either an OIE negligible or controlled BSE risk status, with imports of hamburger meat from a single country with an undetermined BSE risk. These commodities were imported under sanitary conditions that met requirements of Article 11.4.12 of the *Terrestrial Code*, and were either destined for human consumption or classified as safe commodities.

Overall, the Group considered that the conclusion of the entry assessment was that the risk that the BSE agent could have entered Ecuador during the interval covered by the assessment could be considered to be negligible.

- Risk of recycling and amplification of the BSE agent, and appropriate level of control and audit of the feed ban

The Group noted that live cattle were only imported for reproductive purposes and none of them were destined for feed production, and that all individuals that died were buried or incinerated.

The Group requested additional information regarding the definition and removal of SRM. Ecuador indicated that they defined SRM as tissues listed in Article 11.4.14. of the *Terrestrial Code*, and that these were not explicitly defined in any legal instrument. The Group noted that SRM were not removed from the routine slaughter subpopulation as they were of commercial value and intended for human consumption. SRM were removed and destroyed from animals found dead in the pen prior to slaughter or during transportation to the slaughterhouse and were intended for feed industry (i.e., for feed production for non-ruminants). In the event of BSE clinical suspects, the carcasses including the SRM were destroyed or buried.

In the additional information provided with respect to the methods used to produce MBM, Ecuador indicated that raw ruminant materials used in the production of MBM were rendered under high temperature and pressure (133°C for at least 20 minutes with a minimum absolute pressure of 3 bars) after being reduced to a maximum particle size of 50 mm as a part of good manufacturing practices. However, Ecuador acknowledged that a legal framework does not exist regarding procedures to reduce infectivity, and that the rendering plants were not subject to official supervision.

The Group noted that according to Article 1 of Resolution N° 088 (published in the Official Gazette N°309 of 19 April 2001), feeding ruminants with domestic or imported meat, bones and blood meal of ruminant origin was prohibited across the national territory. In response to a follow-up question, Ecuador clarified that as greaves were not considered to be part of ruminant feed, there was no legal instrument prohibiting their use.

Regarding the measures that prevent cross-contamination of cattle feed, the Group noted that, due to the husbandry system in Ecuador, natural pastures were used as the main source of ruminant feed, with plant-based protein supplements for high milk-yielding cows. Moreover, from the additional information, it was noted that feeding of ruminants with fish, poultry and pig proteins was also allowed, and that ruminant MBM was allowed for the feeding of non-ruminants.

The Group noted that there were feed mills producing both feed for ruminants and for non-ruminants. To avoid cross-contamination, raw materials were identified according to their content, separate production lines were established, and final products containing ruminant MBM and tallow were labelled as not suitable for ruminant consumption.

The Group took note that the measures in place to prevent cross-contamination in feed mills were verified through annual visual and documental official inspections by an external body and the verification procedure was supervised by the competent authority, as stipulated in Resolution 066, which was just published in 2017. Moreover, the Group noted that the Plant and Animal Health Regulation and Control Agency started to conduct sampling inspections on feed for ruminants since 2017, and that a small-scale pilot study in 2017 revealed no cases of cross contamination.

Overall, regarding the exposure assessment, the evidence provided was not sufficient to demonstrate that an appropriate level of control and audit of both rendering establishments and feed mills had been in place for at least eight years. Therefore, the Group concluded that the risk of recycling and amplification of the BSE agent if it was present in Ecuador's cattle population during the interval covered by the assessment could not be considered negligible before 2017. Nevertheless, the Group pointed out that in accordance with Article 11.4.2. Point 1 b. of the *Terrestrial Code*, as the entry assessment did not identify a risk factor, the outcome of the exposure assessment would not impact the outcome of the risk assessment.

b) *Surveillance according to Articles 11.4.20. - 11.4.22.*

The Group noted that the surveillance undertaken over a five-year-period from 2014 to 2018 exceeded the minimum requirements of type A surveillance according to Article 11.4.22. on surveillance for BSE in the *Terrestrial Code*. Based on the information provided in the dossier, 340,270.66 surveillance points were collected, compared to a minimal requirement of 300,000 for an adult cattle population over two years of age of 1,938,308.

The Group appreciated the information provided by Ecuador with regard to the methods of dentition to age their cattle.

The Group took note that Ecuador's surveillance programme for BSE targeted at least three of the four surveillance subpopulations every year, except in 2014 when only routine slaughter and clinical suspects were sampled. While samples mostly reflected the cattle distribution in the country, it was noted that Galapagos islands were not represented in the surveillance. The Group recommended that Ecuador include samples also from this area, if relevant, in its surveillance plan. The Group commented on the heavy reliance on the testing of clinical suspects to accumulate surveillance points, which account for 99.5% of the points accumulated to date. However, the Group considered that Ecuador's definition of clinical suspects was in accordance with Article 11.4.21. point 1 of the *Terrestrial Code*.

c) *Other requirements — Article 11.4.2. points 2–4*

▪ Awareness programme

The Group acknowledged that the awareness programme in Ecuador initiated in the last quarter of 2014 with a national coverage. The Group appreciated that this programme, which has been continuously applied, appeared to be both comprehensive and broad in scope, covering all relevant sectors, and acknowledged that it was supported by a range of materials including leaflets and booklets. The Group concluded that this awareness programme has met the requirements of Article 11.4.2 of the *Terrestrial Code* since 2014.

Moreover, the Group also appreciated the thorough BSE Contingency Plan for Ecuador provided as an annex. The document included general aspects of the disease, the organization of the official veterinary service and coordination with public and private entities involved, detailing their activities and responsibilities to be better prepared for the efficient and effective care of an emergency caused by BSE.

- Compulsory notification and investigation

The Group noted that BSE has been compulsorily notifiable throughout the country since 2014 (Resolution 214 issued in 2013 and published in 2014), but that no associated compensation or any penalties existed. Nonetheless, the Group concluded that the system for compulsory notification and investigation has met the requirements of the *Terrestrial Code* since 2014.

- Laboratory examination

The Group noted the official definitions for BSE suspect cases and positive cases used in Ecuador for the purpose of identifying BSE clinical suspects and confirming BSE cases. The Group acknowledged that BSE diagnosis was conducted in an accredited laboratory (Laboratorio de Diagnóstico Animal de la Agencia de Regulación y Control Fito y Zoonosanitario Tumbaco) using a commercial Western immunoblot test listed in the OIE Registry since 2014. Moreover, from the additional information provided by Ecuador, positive laboratory findings would be sent to an OIE reference laboratory for confirmation. The Group acknowledged that the diagnostic procedure has complied with Chapter 2.4.5. of the *Terrestrial Manual* since 2014. The Group recommended Ecuador participate in an external proficiency testing programme.

d) *BSE history in the country*

The Group acknowledged that BSE had never been reported in Ecuador.

e) *Compliance with the questionnaire in Article 1.6.5.*

The Group appreciated the well-structured and comprehensive dossier provided by Ecuador and agreed that the submitted dossier was compliant with the format of the questionnaire in Article 1.6.5. of the *Terrestrial Code*.

f) *Conclusions*

- Recommended status

Considering the information submitted in the dossier and Ecuador's answers to the questions raised, the Group concluded that the application was compliant with the requirements of Article 11.4.4. and with the BSE questionnaire of the *Terrestrial Code*. The Group therefore recommended that Ecuador be recognised as a country with a 'controlled BSE risk status'.

4.2. Other Member request

The Group assessed another request from a Member for the recognition of its BSE controlled risk status. The Group concluded that this Member did not meet the requirements of the *Terrestrial Code* and the corresponding Member was referred back to the dossier.

5. Prion disease in dromedary camels

In response to a request from the OIE Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases, the Group discussed if the 'camel prion disease' reported by Babelhadj et al. 2018² should be considered as an emerging disease based on the criteria listed in the *Terrestrial Code*.

² Babelhadj B, Di Bari MA, Pirisinu L, Chiappini B, et al. (2018) "Prion disease in dromedary camels, Algeria" *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 24(6):1029. Available at: https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/24/6/17-2007_article

An emerging disease in the *Terrestrial Code* is defined as ‘a new occurrence in an animal of a disease, infection or infestation, causing a significant impact on animal or public health resulting from: a) a change of a known pathogenic agent or its spread to a new geographic area or species, or b) a previously unrecognised pathogenic agent or disease diagnosed for the first time’.

While the Group agreed that, within this context, the prion disease reported by Babelhadj and colleagues (2018) could be considered a disease diagnosed for the first time, it was acknowledged that there was insufficient scientific evidence to determine its impact on either animal or public health. The Group discussed the meaning of ‘significant impact’ in the OIE’s definition of emerging disease, and concluded that its evaluation should not just be based on a consideration of the number of animals potentially infected or the prevalence of disease.

The Group recalled the example of chronic wasting disease (CWD), where the impact on wild cervid populations may not be evident for decades. It was not until recently that it was proven that CWD had been driving population declines of wild mule deer and white-tailed deer over the last 30 years in parts of North America (Miller et al., 2008; Edmunds et al., 2016). The Group stressed that even though its geographic distribution kept on expanding each year, its importance had been overlooked.

The Group commended the scientific approach used by Babelhadj and colleagues (2018), and noted that the prevalence and impact of camel prion disease are yet to be investigated. From all accounts it is likely to have been underestimated in the camel population of Algeria, and probably other countries with dromedary camel populations. Considering that a misfolded prion protein had been identified as the causal agent, a potential risk for human and animal transmission cannot be excluded. Therefore, through an abundance of caution based on experiences with BSE and CWD, the Group concluded that this disease should not be overlooked and that it warrants further investigation.

For the aforementioned reasons, further investigations are needed to ensure a more comprehensive evaluation of the distribution and impact of camel prion disease on both animal and public health. The Group concluded that there is sufficient justification to consider it as an emerging disease and that it should be notified to the OIE, when detected by a Member, according to Article 1.1.4 of the *Terrestrial Code*. In addition, the Group recommended that Members pursue further investigation of the disease and gain more knowledge through research to monitor its presence in countries with camel populations as well as to clarify its likely origin and its zoonotic potential. However, considering that there were still significant gaps in the understanding of the epidemiology of the disease, the Group stressed that that Members should not be requested to implement specific control measures if an event was notified.

6. Finalisation and adoption of the draft report

The Group reviewed and amended the draft report. The Group agreed that the report reflected the discussions.

**MEETING OF THE OIE AD HOC GROUP
ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY RISK STATUS EVALUATION
OF MEMBERS
Paris, 29 – 30 October 2018**

Terms of Reference

The OIE *ad hoc* Group on bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) risk status of Members (the Group) is expected to evaluate the applications for official recognition of BSE risk status received from Members.

This implies that the experts, members of this Group, are expected to:

1. Sign off the updated OIE Undertaking on Confidentiality of Information in advance of the meeting of the Group and forward it to the OIE (disease.status@oie.int) at their earliest convenience and before they receive the working documents of the meeting.
2. Complete the Declaration of Interests Form in advance of the meeting of the Group and forward it to the OIE at their earliest convenience and at least two weeks before the meeting.
3. Evaluate the applications from Members for official recognition of BSE risk status:
 - a) Before the meeting:
 - read and study in detail all dossiers provided by the OIE;
 - take into account any other information available in the public domain that is considered pertinent for the evaluation of dossiers;
 - summarise the dossiers according to the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* requirements, using the form provided by the OIE;
 - draft the questions whenever the analysis of the dossier raises questions that need to be clarified or completed with additional details by the applicant Member;
 - send the completed form and the possible questions to the OIE at least one week before the meeting (i.e., no later than 19 October 2018).
 - b) During the meeting:
 - contribute to the discussion with their expertise;
 - withdraw from the discussions and decision making when possible conflict of interest;
 - provide a detailed report to recommend to the Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases the country(ies) or *zone(s)* to be recognised (or not) as having a BSE risk status and to indicate any information gaps or specific areas that should be addressed in the future by the applicant Member.
 - c) After the meeting:
 - contribute electronically to the finalisation of the report if not achieved during the meeting.
4. Considering a paper on the detection of prion disease in dromedary camels, provide:
 - a) an opinion on whether this disease should be considered as an emerging disease as defined in the *Terrestrial Code*, and if so
 - b) recommendations for the correct monitoring of the event in potentially affected countries.

**MEETING OF THE OIE AD HOC GROUP
ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY RISK STATUS EVALUATION
OF MEMBERS
Paris, 29 – 30 October 2018**

Agenda

1. Opening
 2. Adoption of the agenda and appointment of chairperson and rapporteur
 3. Evaluation of applications from a Member for the official recognition of its negligible bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) risk status
 - a. Serbia
 4. Evaluation of application from two Members for official recognition of their controlled BSE risk status:
 - a. Ecuador
 - b. Other Member
 5. Detection of prion disease in dromedary camels
 6. Adoption of the report
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ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY RISK STATUS EVALUATION
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