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# Self-declaration of the recovery of country freedom from infection with high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAI) in poultry by the United Kingdom

**Declaration sent to the OIE on 3 September 2021 by Professor Christine Middlemiss, OIE Delegate for the United Kingdom and UK Chief Veterinary Officer, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs**

## 1. Introduction

The objective of the declaration is to regain self-declared disease freedom from infection with high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAI) in accordance with the provisions of Article 10.4.6. of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (*Terrestrial Code*). The Self-declaration covers the whole country. It describes two separate low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) outbreaks confirmed in poultry; two outbreaks of HPAI subtype H5N1 in poultry; and 22 outbreaks of HPAI subtype H5N8 in poultry and captive birds that occurred in the United Kingdom (UK) between November 2020 and March 2021. The starting date of the self-declaration is 3 September 2021.

## 2. Avian influenza situation in United Kingdom

The UK previously self-declared disease freedom from notifiable avian influenza viruses on 13 June 2020, in accordance with the requirements of the *Terrestrial Code* following an outbreak of LPAI. The disease-free status was maintained until 1 November 2020, when an outbreak of LPAI subtype H5N2<sup>1</sup> was confirmed on a small-scale mixed poultry farm in Deal, Kent through laboratory testing. On 2 November 2020, the first outbreak of HPAI subtype H5N8 was confirmed<sup>2</sup> on a commercial poultry farm (broiler breeder unit) in Frodsham, Cheshire.

A total of 26 outbreaks of AI (2 LPAI and 24 HPAI) were confirmed in poultry and/or captive bird premises in the UK between 1 November 2020 and 31 March 2021. All outbreaks were promptly reported to the OIE via World Animal Health Information System (OIE-WAHIS). All outbreaks were confirmed by real-time PCR followed by sequencing at the OIE and UK National Reference Laboratory, Animal and Plant Health

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<sup>1</sup> [WAHIS report Ref. 16155](#)

<sup>2</sup> [WAHIS report Ref. 16167](#)

Agency (APHA), Weybridge, for outbreaks in Great Britain (GB) and by the OIE and UK National Reference Laboratory APHA Weybridge, and the OIE/FAO and EU Reference Laboratory, Legnaro, Italy (IZSVE) for the Northern Ireland outbreaks. A summary of the outbreaks can be seen in table 1 in Annex 2.

#### **Occurrence of outbreaks of HPAI in poultry**

The HPAI outbreaks reported in poultry between November 2020 and March 2021 consisted of two different subtypes of virus, H5N8 (19 infected poultry premises) and H5N1 (two infected premises). The last outbreak of HPAI in poultry was confirmed on 27 March 2021. The outbreaks of HPAI subtype H5N1 were confirmed as the Eurasian strain by genetic sequencing.

#### **Occurrence of HPAI in captive birds (non-poultry)**

HPAI subtype H5N8 was also confirmed in three non-poultry (captive bird) premises during the same period, with the last outbreak confirmed on 31 March 2021.

#### **Occurrence of LPAI in poultry**

Two LPAI outbreaks; namely LPAI subtypes H5N2 and H5N3 were confirmed on two separate poultry premises on 1 November 2020 and 28 March 2021, respectively. The two outbreaks were unconnected.

### **3. Control and eradication measures in response to avian influenza outbreak**

The UK carried out a rapid and effective disease control programme to eradicate the virus and control the outbreaks, in accordance with national legislation<sup>3</sup> and by following its published Notifiable Avian Disease Control Strategies<sup>4</sup>. All control measures and inspections in Great Britain were carried out promptly by the APHA, which is the government veterinary service in GB, and by the Department of Agriculture, Environment and Rural Affairs (DAERA) in Northern Ireland (NI). The Notifiable Avian Disease Control Strategy, in both GB and NI, is consistent with the *Terrestrial Code*, [Council Directive 2005/94/EC](#) and [Commission Delegated Regulation \(EU\) 2020/687](#).

Vaccination of poultry against AI is not permitted anywhere in the UK. However, preventive vaccination of zoo birds against HPAI is permitted in England and NI, in accordance with the provisions of [Commission Decision 2007/598/EC](#). However, given the increased risk of avian influenza, eight registered zoos in England have applied for a licence to vaccinate zoo birds although to-date no zoo birds have been vaccinated.

A rapid, effective stamping out policy was implemented at all infected premises in accordance with the *Terrestrial Code*. Measures at infected premises included the humane culling of all birds on the infected premises, disposing of the carcasses in a bio-secure manner via rendering or incineration. Cleansing and disinfection (C&D) of the infected premises, equipment, vehicles and anything that could spread the virus in and outside of the premises was also undertaken. The last HPAI outbreak in poultry was confirmed on 27 March 2021, culling of all birds and disposal of carcasses was completed on 30 March. Initial C&D in accordance with national legislation<sup>3</sup> was completed on the premises on 1 April 2021. Final cleansing and disinfection was however not completed and approved by APHA until 05 August 2021, due to the nature and complexity of the poultry premises.

Following the confirmation of each case of HPAI in poultry, a 3 km Protection Zone (PZ) and a 10 km Surveillance Zone (SZ) were established around the infected premises. Disease control measures were

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<sup>3</sup> National legislation:

[The Avian Influenza and Influenza of Avian Origin in Mammals \(England\) \(No.2\) Order 2006](#)

[The Avian Influenza and Influenza of Avian Origin in Mammals \(Scotland\) Order 2006](#)

[The Avian Influenza and Influenza of Avian Origin in Mammals \(Wales\) \(No.2\) Order 2006](#)

[The Avian Influenza and Influenza of Avian Origin in Mammals Regulations \(Northern Ireland\) Order 2007](#)

<sup>4</sup> Control Strategies:

[Notifiable Avian Disease Control Strategy for GB](#)

[Notifiable Epizootic Avian Disease Control Strategy for NI](#)

implemented in accordance with national legislation and respective control strategy. For the outbreaks of LPAI, a 1 km Restricted Zone was established around each infected premises in which similar disease control measures were also applied.

Measures in disease control zones included, movement restrictions of poultry, poultry products including hatching eggs, captive birds, and other things likely to transmit disease to, from and within the zone. Personnel entering or leaving poultry and other captive bird premises in the control zones were required to observe appropriate biosecurity measures aimed at preventing the spread of AI virus.

Following a risk assessment and in accordance with national legislation<sup>3</sup>, the competent authority did not declare control zones around two of the infected premises where outbreaks of HPAI subtype H5N8 was confirmed in captive birds (non-poultry). In these cases, the infected premises only contained captive birds and were regarded as “special category premises”. In the case of a third premises, following a risk assessment, a 3 km disease control zone was established around the infected captive bird premises where certain disease measures applied.

A census to identify all premises containing commercial poultry was undertaken in both the Protection and Surveillance Zones. Foot patrols were undertaken in the Protection Zone as part of this census, to identify all premises, including backyard premises, that contained poultry or other captive birds. Guidance notes were also sent to all premises within the 3 km PZ to raise awareness and remind keepers of the restrictions applying in the zone including the prompt reporting of suspect cases. Poultry on premises in the PZ were subjected to veterinary clinical inspection and sampling where required. No evidence of HPAI virus was identified. In the 10 km SZ, poultry keepers were sent guidance notes to raise awareness and reminded of the measures that applied in the zone, including the need to ensure prompt reporting of suspect cases.

For the LPAI outbreaks, foot patrols were conducted to identify all poultry and captive bird premises in the 1 km Restricted Zones (RZs). All poultry within the RZs were subjected to veterinary clinical inspection with sampling and testing undertaken on the birds. Written advice and guidance were provided to all premises. All birds were subjected to a further final clinical investigation (with sampling repeated where previously undertaken), prior to lifting of the Restricted Zones. All results were negative.

Extensive epidemiological investigations were conducted to detect the possible source and spread of infection to any further premises linked with the infected premises, either through known contacts (source or spread tracings) or as a result of proximity (PZ, SZ or RZ).

No further cases of AI were detected by the epidemiological investigations. The epidemiological investigations concluded that the most likely route of introduction of virus onto all the infected premises was direct or indirect contact with wild birds. The likelihood of an incursion such as these onto an individual premises remains a low likelihood event and is influenced by the effectiveness of the biosecurity measures that have been implemented.

Full epidemiological enquires were carried out on the HPAI outbreaks both in GB and NI, and the reports are published under these links: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/reports-relating-to-recent-cases-ofavian-influenzabird-flu> and <https://www.daera-ni.gov.uk/publications/avian-influenza-epidemiology-reports>

Re-population (restocking) of infected premises with sentinel birds is undertaken in accordance with national legislation. Re-population is not permitted until at least 21 days after final cleansing and disinfection has been completed and approved by APHA/DAERA or after 12 months from initial cleansing and disinfection. Where sentinel re-population has been undertaken, clinical inspection and sampling of poultry were undertaken before premises were re-populated. Further clinical inspection and sampling were undertaken during the 21 days following placement of birds. All results have been negative.

### **Additional disease control measures**

A range of additional measures were put in place during the period of heightened risk of incursion of avian influenza from wild birds, to protect poultry and stop the spread of the virus. Enhanced mandatory biosecurity measures were implemented across GB on 11 November 2020, and in NI on 1 December, by declaring Avian Influenza Prevention Zones. Further measures were introduced based on risk assessments, including mandatory housing of poultry and captive birds (except where there were welfare concerns) on 14 December 2020 in GB, and on 23 December 2020, in NI. The measures were withdrawn gradually, following risk assessment once the risk level was assessed to have reduced. All risk assessments are available under the following link: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/animal-diseases-international-monitoring>

## **4. Surveillance programme and early detection system**

The UK has a comprehensive surveillance programme to rapidly detect early incursion of disease and to demonstrate freedom from infection with HPAI and notifiable LPAI. The programme includes a passive component and an active component, in accordance with Chapter 1.4. and Articles 10.4.26. to 10.4.30. of the *Terrestrial Code* as follows:

### **4.1. Passive surveillance in poultry**

#### **Obligation to report a clinical suspicion of avian influenza**

Both HPAI and LPAI are notifiable diseases in the UK in accordance with national legislation<sup>3</sup>. The reporting of suspicion of AI by poultry keepers/owners and private veterinarians is a legal requirement in the whole country. In GB, all suspected cases of AI are investigated promptly by APHA. Where disease cannot be ruled out, samples are taken and sent to the OIE and UK National Reference Laboratory, APHA, Weybridge for laboratory testing. Suspect cases in NI are investigated promptly by DAERA, where disease cannot be ruled out, samples are sent to Agri-Food and Biosciences Institute (AFBI) Official Laboratory for laboratory testing.

#### **Early Warning System**

In addition to the obligation of reporting any suspicion, a scheme that enables testing to exclude the involvement of a notifiable avian disease (including AI) has been operating in GB since May 2014. Private veterinarians can request official laboratory testing of galliform (chicken or turkey) flocks in cases where the involvement of AI is not formally suspected but cannot be excluded from the differential diagnosis in a flock health or production problem.

#### **Awareness programme**

The UK government has a horizon scanning programme and continuously engages with poultry stakeholders informing them about the avian influenza situation in the UK, and internationally. During the outbreak period meetings with stakeholders were held on a weekly basis. Press notices, social media platforms, text alert service and newsletters are used regularly to raise awareness to poultry industry and general public on the disease situation, the need to practise strict biosecurity and report suspicion of disease. Guidance and advice on avian influenza for all bird keepers are published on various government websites and regularly reviewed to include the latest disease situation. The UK Government also performs ongoing risk assessments on the risk of incursion of avian influenza in poultry and publishes the reports on the link below: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/animal-diseases-international-monitoring>

### **4.2. Active surveillance in poultry**

Active serological surveillance of avian influenza viruses in domestic poultry is carried out annually in UK, as required by UK legislation<sup>3</sup>. The programme is risk-based and targeted and is consistent with the sampling guidelines laid down [Commission Decision 2010/367/EU](#). The sampling strategy takes into consideration the following factors:

- areas at potential higher risk of AI incursion
- areas with presence of high densities of higher-risk poultry holdings
- areas that have an increased abundance of certain species of wild birds

Blood samples are taken from a number of birds on each premises and screened for the presence of antibodies to AI viruses of subtypes H5 and H7. A full epidemiological investigation, together with PCR testing is used in the case of a non- negative serological result to confirm whether the relevant flock is infected by an avian influenza virus. All laboratory testing in GB is carried out at OIE and UK National Reference Laboratory, APHA Weybridge. In Northern Ireland, serum samples are tested at the Agri-Food and Biosciences Institute (AFBI), with any positive findings sent to APHA, Weybridge and the OIE/FAO and EU Reference Laboratory, Legnaro, Italy (IZSve) for confirmatory testing. The results of AI surveillance in poultry undertaken in 2020 and the second quarter of 2021 are summarised in tables 2 and 3, in Annex 2.

#### Additional surveillance

Enhanced surveillance of poultry and captive birds was also undertaken within 0 -10 km around infected premises where HPAI was confirmed in 2021, in GB, for a period of 90 days, following effective initial cleansing and disinfection. Surveillance consisted of both clinical inspection and sampling of high-risk poultry such as anseriformes. All clinically unwell birds were dealt with as suspect cases, and subject to full veterinary inquiry including diagnostic testing. The results of all sampling were negative.

Additional surveillance was also carried out in NI following final cleansing and disinfection of infected premises, for a period of 90 days. Sampling was based on guidelines laid down in Commission Decision 2010/367/EU. All results were negative.

#### 4.3. Wild bird monitoring

Passive surveillance of wild birds consistent with the requirements of [Commission Decision 2010/367/EU](#). In Great Britain, the virological survey operates all-year-round and is made up of patrols by wild bird reserve wardens and collections of found-dead wild birds reported by members of the public. In Northern Ireland, DAERA operates an early warning detection system which allows for members of the public and veterinarians to notify the Department of any sick or dead wild birds. This first finding of HPAI H5N8 in wild birds in the UK, was detected in a swan on 8 November 2020 in Devon. Table 4 summarises the UK's results of passive surveillance in wild birds in 2020 and for part of 2021 (January – August).

Year	Number of wild birds sampled	Influenza A positive birds	Number of PCR tests	Positive for LPAI H5 or LPAI H7	Positive for HPAI H5 or HPAI H7
2020	1310	440	2326*	0	288
2021	1183**	50	2278*	0	36

\* This is the total number of PCR tests performed for all wild birds sampled (generally two per bird but in the case of positive samples, further PCR testing is carried out)  
 \*\* Number of samples: January - August 2021 only.

### 5. Measures implemented to maintain freedom

The UK government continues to monitor for incursions of AI and regularly engages with poultry industry stakeholders to raise awareness of the disease situation in the UK and internationally, including the need to always practice strict biosecurity measures and report suspicion of notifiable avian diseases. Social media platforms are also used to raised awareness on the need to practice strict biosecurity and report suspicion of disease.

Detailed biosecurity guidance<sup>5</sup> has also been produced for poultry keepers/owners to implement in order to reduce the risk of direct and indirect introduction of avian influenza virus into poultry premises from wild birds and other sources of contamination.

In accordance with national legislation<sup>3</sup>, the UK government can, on the basis of a veterinary risk assessment, implement mandatory enhanced biosecurity measures to reduce the risk of transmission of avian influenza to poultry from wild birds by declaring an Avian Influenza Prevention Zone. These measures were implemented during the heightened risk period in late 2020 and early 2021 (see section 3).

Effective surveillance is also carried out throughout the year to guarantee rapid detection of any incursion of disease.

Imports of poultry and poultry products into the UK are carried out in accordance with the provisions of Articles 10.4.7. to 10.4.22. of the *Terrestrial Code*. All imports of poultry, poultry products and hatching eggs in GB are subject to veterinary certification in accordance with the provisions of EU [Council Directive 2009/158/EC](#) (until 31 December 2020) and [Commission Regulation \(EC\) No 798/2008](#). In NI, all imports of poultry, poultry products and hatching eggs are subject to veterinary certification in accordance with (until 20 April 2021) the provisions of EU [Council Directive 2009/158/EC](#) and [Commission Regulation \(EC\) No 798/2008](#); (from 21 April 2021) [Regulation \(EU\) 2016/429](#) (Animal Health Law) and [Commission Delegated Regulation \(EU\) 2020/688](#).

## 6. Conclusion

Considering that:

- Avian influenza is a notifiable disease in the United Kingdom;
- prior to the occurrence of the new outbreak in November 2020, the United Kingdom had been free from AI viruses in poultry (self-declaration on 12 June 2020);
- a continuous awareness programme about the disease is in place;
- a stamping out policy, including cleansing and disinfection was applied to infected premises following confirmation of outbreaks (the last cleansing and disinfection was completed and approved on 5 August 2021);
- 28 days have elapsed as prescribed in Article 10.4.6. of the *Terrestrial Code* since the end of the cleansing and disinfection of the last infected premises;
- surveillance has been carried out in accordance with Articles 10.4.26. to 10.4.30. of the *Terrestrial Code*.

**The OIE Delegate of the United Kingdom declares that the country complies with the requirements for “a country free from infection with high pathogenicity avian influenza viruses (HPAI) in poultry” as of 3 September 2021, in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 1.6. and Article 10.4.6. of the *Terrestrial Code* (2021) and consistent the information provided in OIE-WAHIS.**

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<sup>5</sup> [Biosecurity advice to all poultry and captive bird keepers in GB](#)  
[Biosecurity guidance for all bird keepers in NI](#)

Statement to be included in the self-declaration document.

I, the undersigned, Professor Christine Middlemiss, Delegate of United Kingdom to the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), takes responsibility for the self-declaration of freedom from Notifiable Avian Influenza in accordance with the provisions of Article 10.4.6. of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code.

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Drawn up on 2 September 2021

Signature of the Delegate:



PROFESSOR CHRISTINE MIDDLEMISS

UK CHIEF VETERINARY OFFICER



Annex 2

Table 1: Summary of HPAI and LPAI outbreaks 2020/2021

HPAI and LPAI outbreaks in poultry							
GB/NI outbreak number	OIE-WAHIS event ID	OIE-WAHIS outbreak no.	HPAI/LPAI confirmation date	Pathotype and subtype	Location	Premises type	Cleansing and disinfection completion and approval date
AIV2020/01	36401	1000138879	01/11/2020	LPAI H5N2	Deal, Kent, England	Commercial small-scale mixed poultry farm/premises	14/07/2021
AIV 2020/02	36417	1000138940	02/11/2020	HPAI H5N8	Frodsham, Cheshire, England	Commercial broiler breeder rearer	11/01/2021
AIV 2020/03	36417	1000139343	10/11/2020	HPAI H5N8	Near Leominster, Herefordshire, England	Commercial broiler breeder rearer	29/01/2021
AIV 2020/05	36417	1000140280	23/11/2020	HPAI H5N8	Near Melton Mowbray, Leicestershire, England	Poultry and captive birds	08/02/2021
AIV 2020/06	36417	1000140287	29/11/2020	HPAI H5N8	Near Northallerton, North Yorkshire, England	Commercial turkey fattening	05/05/2021
AIV 2020/07	36417	1000140950	01/12/2020	HPAI H5N8	Near Northallerton, North Yorkshire, England	Commercial turkey rearing	21/05/2021
AIV 2020/08	36417	1000140954	04/12/2020	HPAI H5N8	(Snetterton)Near Attleborough, Norfolk, England	Commercial turkey rearing	16/07/2021
AIV 2020/09	36417	1000140956	05/12/2020	HPAI H5N8	Near Kings Lynn Norfolk, England	Commercial turkey rearing	01/04/2021
AIV 2020/11	36417	1000141410	15/12/2020	HPAI H5N8	Near Willington, Derbyshire, England	Falcon breeding establishment with some poultry species	31/03/2021
AIV 2020/12	37173	1000141458	18/12/2020	HPAI H5N1	Near Hawes, North Yorkshire, England	Backyard poultry	06/05/2021
AIV 2020/13	36417	1000141654	19/12/2020	HPAI H5N8	Island of Sanday, Orkney Islands, Scotland	Small commercial free-range layers	15/03/2021



AIV 2020/14	36417	1000141655	19/12/2020	H5N8	Near Gillingham, North Dorset, England	Backyard poultry	01/02/2021
AIV 2020/15	36417	1000141656	20/12/2020	H5N8	Near Attleborough, Breckland, Norfolk, England	Commercial breeding duck	01/04/2021
AIV 2020/16	36417	1000142364	28/12/2020	H5N8	Near Great Ellingham, Norfolk, England	Backyard poultry	30/03/2021
AIV 2020/17	36417	ob_88009	28/12/2020	H5N8	Near Ickburgh, Norfolk, England	Commercial duck rearing	14/05/2021
AIV 2020/18	36417	1000142365	29/12/2020	H5N8	Near Aylesbeare, Devon, England	Backyard poultry	25/03/2021
AI/35/2020/IP1	36417	1000142902	06/01/2021	H5N8	Ballymena, County Antrim, NI	Commercial layer rearer	22/03/2021
AI/01/2021/IP2 NI	36417	1000143317	12/01/2021	H5N8	Lisburn, County Antrim, NI	Commercial layer	21/04/2021
AIV 2021/01	36417	1000144819	28/01/2021	H5N8	Near Amlwch, Isle of Anglesey, Wales	Game bird	22/02/2021
AIV 2021/02	36417	1000146316	06/02/2021	H5N8	Near Redcar, Redcar and Cleveland, England	Commercial laying hen	23/06/2021
AIV 2021/03	37173	1000146779	11/02/2021	H5N1	(Nr Leven) Near Glenrothes, Scotland	Game bird rearing premises	18/03/2021
AIV 2021/04	evt_3627	ob_83241	28/03/2021	LPAI H5N3	Cheshire, England	Commercial turkey breeder flock	05/07/2021
AIV 2021/05	36417	ob_83484	27/03/2021	H5N8	Near Uttoxeter, East Staffordshire, England	Commercial broiler	05/08/2021

HPAI in captive birds							
Outbreak number	OIE-WAHIS event ID	OIE-WAHIS outbreak no.	HPAI/LPAI confirmation date	Subtype	Location	Premises type	Cleansing and disinfection completion and approval date
AIV 2020/04	36506	1000140350	20/11/2020	HPAI H5N8	Near Stroud, Gloucestershire, England	Captive birds	26/01/2021
AIV 2020/10	36506	1000141414	13/12/2020	HPAI H5N8	Near Droitwich Spa, Worcestershire, England	Captive birds	26/03/2021
AIV 2021/06	36506	ob_84011	31/03/2021	HPAI H5N8	Near Skelmersdale, West Lancashire, England	Captive birds	20/05/2021

Table 2: Results of UK active surveillance programme for avian influenza in poultry in 2020							
Country	Types of poultry sampled	Number of holdings to be sampled	Number of holdings sampled	Number of samples	Number of seropositive for H5 (premises)	Number of seropositive for H7(premises)	Number of H5 PCR /Virus isolation positive
England	(Game)Ducks	7	7	140	0	0	0
	Ducks	37	37	740	2	0	1*
	Fowl (Breeders)	4	4	90	0	0	0
	Fowl (Layers)	30	30	386	0	0	0
	Geese	19	19	370	1	0	0
	Partridges	5	5	52	0	0	0
	Pheasants	6	6	70	0	0	0
	Turkey (Breeders)	8	8	85	0	0	0
Scotland	Turkey (Fatteners)	41	41	520	0	0	0
	Ducks	2	2	40	0	0	0
	Fowl (Layers)	2	2	20	0	0	0
Wales	Pheasant	2	2	30	0	0	0
	Ducks	1	1	20	0	0	0
	Fowl (Layers)	1	1	10	0	0	0
Northern Ireland	Turkey (Fatteners)	1	1	10	0	0	0
	Fowl (Breeders)	3	3	30	0	0	0
	Fowl (Layers)	12	12	100	0	0	0
	Geese	2	2	80	0	0	0
Northern Ireland	Turkey (Fatteners)	1	1	10	0	0	0
	Ducks	4	4	160	0	0	0
<i>Note:</i> Serologically positive results were followed up by thorough epidemiological investigation and sampling for PCR testing. *LPAI H5N2, see table 1							

**Table 3: Results of Active surveillance programme for avian influenza in poultry 2021 (until 24 August)**

Country	Poultry category sampled	Number of holdings to be sampled	Number of holdings sampled to-date	Number of samples	Number of seropositive for H5	Number of seropositive for H7	Number of H5 PCR /Virus isolation positive
England	(Game)Ducks	13	2	40	2	0	0
	Ducks	58	13	260	0	0	0
	Fowl (Breeders)	6	5	85	0	0	0
	Fowl (Layers)	36	13	155	0	0	0
	Geese	56	2	30	0	0	0
	Partridges	20	7	77	0	0	0
	Pheasants	32	17	175	0	0	0
	Turkey (Breeders)	10	3	50	0	0	0
Scotland	Turkey (Fatteners)	48	4	60	0	0	0
	Ducks	1					
	Fowl (Layers)	2	2	35	0	0	0
	Partridges	1	1	10	0	0	0
Wales	Pheasants	1	1	10	0	0	0
	Ducks	2	1	20	0	0	0
	Geese	1					
	Fowl (Breeders)	1					
	Fowl (Layers)	1	1	10	0	0	0
Northern Ireland	Turkey (Fatteners)	1					
	Game Ducks	4					
	Ducks	3					
	Fowl (Breeders)	12					
	Fowl (Layers)	2					
	Geese	1					

**Note:** Serologically positive results were followed up by thorough epidemiological investigation and sampling for PCR testing, no evidence of notifiable avian influenza infection was found.

Previous results of UK active surveillance in poultry and passive surveillance in wild birds can be found at the links below: <https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/j.efsa.2019.5945>