

## RESOLUTION No. 18

**Declaration of Global Eradication of Rinderpest and Implementation of Follow-up Measures to Maintain World Freedom from Rinderpest**

ACKNOWLEDGING the efforts made by Members, non-Members, OIE, FAO, IAEA, other international organisations, regional organisations, the veterinary profession, the scientific community, donors and other partners to eradicate rinderpest;

CONSIDERING the contributions made by OIE and FAO towards global freedom from rinderpest;

NOTING the conclusions of the Final Report of the Joint FAO/OIE Committee on Global Rinderpest Eradication that rinderpest virus has ceased to circulate in animals;

REITERATING the importance of reducing the number of existing rinderpest virus stocks through the destruction of virus in a safe manner and/or the transfer of virus stocks to internationally recognised reference institutions; and

MINDFUL of the need for the international community and the responsibility of national authorities to take the necessary measures to ensure that the world remains free from rinderpest,

## THE ASSEMBLY

1. DECLARES solemnly that the world has achieved freedom from rinderpest in its natural setting, one of the most dreadful animal diseases with severe impacts on livelihoods.
2. EXPRESSES its deep gratitude to all nations, organisations and individuals who contributed to the fight against rinderpest and the successful eradication of the disease.
3. UNDERTAKES to reduce, around the world, the number of institutions holding rinderpest virus-containing material other than attenuated vaccines, under approved conditions and according to relevant guidelines.
4. URGES the membership:
  - To maintain, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the OIE *Terrestrial Animal Health Code*, appropriate surveillance systems for rinderpest and immediately notify the OIE of suspect or confirmed cases of rinderpest;
  - To collaborate with OIE and FAO in managing confirmed or suspected outbreaks of rinderpest, through the provision of information, support and facilitation;
  - To put in place and update national contingency plans consistent with international guidance from OIE and FAO;

- To destroy, under the supervision of the Veterinary Authority, rinderpest virus-containing materials or assure the storage or use of these materials in a biosecure facility in their country or, where applicable, assure the safe transfer to an approved laboratory in another country in agreement with the Veterinary Authority of the receiving country and complying with the standards of the OIE *Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals* and the Guidelines elaborated by the Joint FAO/OIE Committee on Global Rinderpest Eradication (Appendix);
  - To take effective measures to forbid synthesis of rinderpest full-length infectious clones unless approved by the relevant authorities, OIE and FAO;
  - To use rinderpest vaccines solely for the emergency management of confirmed rinderpest outbreaks under the authority of the Veterinary Services following international and regional guidelines and not to use rinderpest vaccines to protect animal populations from other morbillivirus infections;
  - To ensure that rinderpest occupies an appropriate place in veterinary education curricula and training programmes to maintain professional knowledge and adequate diagnostic capabilities at national levels.
5. REQUESTS the Director General:
- To approve, jointly with FAO, facilities in which rinderpest virus-containing material can be held, and conduct regular site visits to those facilities to verify whether their biosafety/biosecurity conditions are adequate;
  - To maintain and regularly update, jointly with FAO, an inventory of facilities holding rinderpest virus-containing material;
  - To establish, jointly with FAO, an advisory body that assists both Organisations in (i) the approval of facilities for holding rinderpest virus-containing material and of facilities that produce and/or hold rinderpest vaccines, (ii) the approval of requests for research and other manipulations of the rinderpest virus, (iii) reviewing the plans and results of regular site visits of virus repositories, and (iv) planning and implementing other rinderpest-related activities as required;
  - To develop and update, in collaboration with FAO, a plan of action for the post-eradication activities at the international level;
  - To facilitate and make sustainable, in collaboration with FAO, the provision of technical assistance to OIE Members in the maintenance of adequate surveillance systems and national preparedness, and to facilitate their access to diagnostic reagents or facilities and relevant rinderpest vaccines;
  - To ensure that OIE Members are informed of the status of rinderpest virus sequestration and research involving rinderpest virus.
6. REQUESTS the relevant Specialist Commissions to complete the necessary revisions to the relevant chapters of the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* and the *Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals* as soon as possible.

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(Adopted by the World Assembly of Delegates of the OIE on 25 May 2011)

## **Global Rinderpest Eradication: Guidelines for Rinderpest Virus Sequestration**

**Endorsed with amendments on 28 January 2010  
by the Biological Standards Commission of the OIE**

**Endorsed with amendments on 14 April 2010  
by the Joint FAO/OIE Committee on Global Rinderpest Eradication**

### ***Introduction***

The global eradication of rinderpest creates a duty for the international community to prevent the re-emergence of the disease through release of virus from laboratory sources. To this end FAO and OIE shall establish the principle of international oversight and regulation of facilities holding rinderpest virus containing material. The objective of the present guidelines is to ensure secure handling and sequestration of rinderpest virus in the post-eradication era. FAO and OIE and Member states undertake to reduce the number of virus repositories in order to minimise the risk of accidental release.

FAO and OIE, in collaboration with Member states, will put in place global contingency plans and will ensure approval of a minimum number of repositories and Reference Centres/Reference Laboratories necessary to maintain preparedness against releases of the virus into the environment. These plans will include, amongst others, vaccine production, vaccine banks and deployment of vaccines in case of emergency. Vaccines should be available to countries for immediate dissemination in case of emergency. The following guidelines deal with biosafety and bio-containment measures to be observed in laboratories and other facilities holding rinderpest virus containing material.

### ***Definitions***

For the purpose of these guidelines the following definitions apply:

An *approved BSL3 facility* means a facility that is jointly approved by FAO and OIE and subject to joint regular inspection. The facility meets BSL3 standards as defined in chapter 1.1.2 of the OIE *Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals*, is certified by the *Veterinary Authority*, and in addition has mandatory shower out for staff and either an exclusion zone or a restricted movement zone for rinderpest-susceptible species around the facility. Staff are subject to restriction on contact with susceptible species (e.g. on farms, in zoos)<sup>1</sup>.

*Rinderpest virus-containing material* means field and laboratory strains of rinderpest virus; vaccine strains of rinderpest virus including valid and expired vaccine stocks; tissues, sera and other clinical material from infected or suspect animals; and diagnostic material containing or encoding live virus. Recombinant morbilliviruses (segmented or non-segmented) containing unique rinderpest virus nucleic acid or amino acid sequences are considered to be rinderpest virus. Full length genomic material including virus RNA and cDNA copies of virus RNA is considered to be *rinderpest virus-containing material*. Sub-genomic fragments of morbillivirus nucleic acid that are not capable of being incorporated in a replicating morbillivirus or morbillivirus-like virus are not considered as *rinderpest virus-containing material*.

*Veterinary Authority* means the Governmental Authority of an OIE/FAO Member, comprising veterinarians, other professionals and para-professionals, having the responsibility and competence for ensuring or supervising the implementation of animal health and welfare measures, international veterinary

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<sup>1</sup> A detailed protocol on the approval and inspection process for BSL3 facility will be jointly developed by FAO and OIE.

certification and other standards and recommendations in the OIE *Terrestrial Animal Health Code* in the whole territory.

#### ***Guidelines for rinderpest virus sequestration***

1. All manipulation of *rinderpest virus-containing materials*, including vaccine production, shall be forbidden unless approved the *Veterinary Authority* and by FAO and OIE. An advisory body, jointly established by FAO and OIE, shall be tasked to approve in advance and monitor any activities involving the use of *rinderpest virus-containing material*.
2. All countries shall either destroy or transparently audit and manage all remaining *rinderpest virus-containing material* under biologically secure conditions. The *Veterinary Authority* shall be kept aware of and be held responsible for any activity involving *rinderpest virus-containing material*.
3. *Rinderpest virus-containing material*, with the exception of stocks of packaged, manufactured vaccines, must only be kept, and can only be manipulated, in an *approved BSL3 facility*.
4. Master seed stocks must be maintained in, and tested by, the *approved BSL3 facilities* designated by FAO and OIE. Stocks of packaged, manufactured vaccines, as covered under *rinderpest virus-containing material*, shall only be kept in FAO and OIE approved facilities which are subject to joint regular inspection. Any expired vaccine stocks shall be destroyed by a validated process.
5. *Rinderpest virus-containing material* that is not in an *approved BSL3 facility* shall be destroyed by a validated process or transferred to an *approved BSL3 facility*. Its relocation or destruction shall be supervised and documented by the *Veterinary Authority* and be notified to FAO and OIE.
6. Transfers of *rinderpest virus-containing material* to an *approved BSL3 facility* located in another country must be notified to FAO and OIE; such material may remain the property of the country of origin.
7. Transport (intra and inter-country) arrangements for *rinderpest virus-containing material* shall be agreed by the relevant *Veterinary Authorities* in advance and in accordance with chapter 1.1.1 of the OIE *Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals*.
8. FAO and OIE shall establish and maintain a single global inventory on all existing *rinderpest virus-containing materials*, including vaccine stocks and the facilities holding such stocks and any movement of such materials. The global database shall be kept up-to-date on a permanent basis.
9. FAO and OIE shall develop a mechanism to facilitate and standardise reporting of *rinderpest virus-containing material* by *Veterinary Authorities* to update the global database.
10. FAO and OIE shall widely publicise the availability of internationally accessible rinderpest vaccine stocks to assist in convincing national authorities that they do not need to continue holding *rinderpest virus-containing material*.
11. FAO and OIE shall develop a set of guidelines and standard operating procedures to govern the maintenance of rinderpest vaccine stocks and their use for emergency purposes.
12. FAO and OIE, through their Reference Centres and Reference Laboratories, (including the laboratory of the Joint FAO/IAEA division) shall advise regional, national and international partners on laboratory-related issues having to do with rinderpest virus, including virus sequestration, destruction and disinfection protocols and diagnostic quality control.
13. FAO and OIE shall oversee the development of diagnostic kits that do not require the use of live virus within the kit itself or during the manufacture of the kit.